Abstract
1. The foreign policy proposals contained in the Programme of the Unidad Popular (UP) showed clearly that its political objectives had an international dimension. This was inevitable because a socialist transformation of Chilean society affected substantial foreign interests. It also disturbed the political status quo in Latin America and introduced an element of strife and disruption into the inter-American system (basically the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR)). It therefore had an influence on the world political scene of which the main feature is the struggle between the capitalist world, led by the United States, and the socialist states led by the Soviet Union.1
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Notes
See Covert Action in Chile, 1963–73. Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Washington, D.C., United States Senate, the U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). This report (known as the ‘Church Report’ as Senator Frank Church chaired the Committee) claims that in an off-the-record conversation with a journalist a few days after the Chilean elections (on 16 September 1970), ‘Henry Kissinger warns that Allende’s election was irreversible, might affect neighboring nations and would pose “massive problems” for the U.S. and Latin America’ (58).
According to Covert Action in Chile…, 58, on 15 September 1970 President Nixon ‘instructs CIA Director Richard Helms with the task to prevent Allende’s accession to office. The CIA is to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d’état. This involvement becomes known as Track II [Pista Dos].’
See Covert Action in Chile… and Hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, volume 7, Covert Action (Washington, D.C., The U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).
See Covert Action in Chile…, 58. On 8 and 14 September 1970, ‘40 Committee discusses the Chilean situation. The Committee approves $250,000 for the use of Ambassador Korry to influence the 24 October Chilean Congressional vote’.
In October 1971, Secretary of State Rogers met with representatives of Anaconda, Ford Motor Company, First National City Bank, Bank of America, Ralston Purina and International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT). A possible embargo on spare parts and materials for Chile was discussed, as were the U.S. Government’s plans to stop all aid to Chile under the Hickenlooper Amendment. ITT presented a detailed memorandum requesting that pressure be put on Chile and suggesting the formation of a special unit within the National Security Council to take charge of these types of measures.
There is, in Covert Action in Chile…, 59-61, evidence that the following measures were supported in order to influence Chilean political developments and ‘destabilize’ the UP Government: 1970 14 October: ‘40 Committee approves $60,000 for Ambassador Korry’s proposal to purchase a radio station.…’ 13 November: ‘40 Committee approves $25,000 to support Christian Democratic candidates.’ 19 November: ‘40 Committee approves $750,000 for clandestine operations in Chile.’ 1971 28 January: ‘40 Committee approves $1,240,000 for the purchase of radio stations and newspapers and to support candidates in municipal and other activities of anti-Allende parties.’ 22 March: ‘40 Committee approves $185,000 additional support to the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).’ 10 May: ‘40 Committee approves $77,000 for purchase of a press for the Christian Democratic Party newspaper. The press is not obtained and the funds are used to support the paper.’ 20 May: ‘40 Committee approves $100,000 in emergency aid to the Christian Democratic Party to meet short term debts.’ 26 May: ‘40 Committee approves $150,000 for additional aid to the Christian Democratic Party to meet debts.’ 6 July: ‘40 Committee approves $150,000 for support of opposition candidates in a Chilean by-election.’ 9 September: ‘40 Committee approves $700,000 for support to the major Santiago newspaper, El Mercurio.’ 5 November: ‘40 Committee approves $815,000 support to opposition parties and to induce a split in the Popular Unity coalition.’ 15 December: ‘40 Committee approves $160,000 to support two opposition candidates in January 1972 by-elections.’ 1972 11 April: ‘40 Committee approves $965,000 for additional support to El Mercurio.’ 24 April: ‘40 Committee approves $50,000 for an effort to splinter the Popular Unity coalition.’ 16 June: ‘40 Committee approves $46,500 to support a candidate in a Chilean by-election.’ 21 September: ‘40 Committee approves $24,000 to support an anti-Allende businessmen’s organization Sociedad de Fomento Fabril.’ 26 October: ‘40 Committee approves $1,427,666 to support opposition political parties and private sector organizations in anticipation of March 1973 Congressional elections.’ 1973 12 February: ‘40 Committee approves $200,000 to support opposition political parties in the Congressional elections.’ 20 August: ‘40 Committee approves $1 million to support opposition political parties and private sector organizations money is not spent.’ 15 October (after the coup d’état): ‘40 Committee approves $34,000 for an anti-Allende radio station and travel costs of pro-junta spokesmen.’
‘In the case of aggression against Chile, the CIA was designed as the responsible coordinator for clandestine operations, while the Naval Intelligence Service was the responsible coordinator for military problems.’ Pedro Vuskovic, Acusación al imperialismo [Accusation Against Imperialism] (Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1975), 24.
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Almeyda, C. (1979). The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government. In: Sideri, S. (eds) Chile 1970–73: Economic Development and its International Setting. Institute of Social Studies, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8902-6_4
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