Abstract
In the previous chapter I described reconstructionism, quite generally, as a method of analysis whereby propositions in ordinary language are reformulated so as to rid them of their misleading grammatical forms and exhibit the true constituents of facts they may assert. So characterized, reconstructionism may be said to represent the common denominator of a number of somewhat diverse analytic techniques employed by Russell at various times, collected under a single rubric. Professor Weitz has suggested — correctly, I believe — that there is a basic similarity between the analytic techniques Russell calls, variously, (I) the analysis of denoting phrases, (2) the analysis of incomplete symbols, (3) constructionism, and (4) the principle which dispenses with abstractionism.1 All of these, it seems to me, aim at accomplishing the purpose I have indicated as the overall aim of reconstructionism, taken as a general method. As I am using the term, then, “reconstructionism” signifies not so much a single method as a “family” of analytic methods that have an essentially common function.
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References
See P.B.R., p. 92. Weitz adds to this list “the logical-analytic method.” I would agree that in some instances of Russell’s use of this method he is engaged in the same kind of analysis that characterizes the other four techniques, but not, I think, in all of them.
Cf. O.K.E.W., pp. 86, 116; P.L.A., 221; P.B.R., pp. 13, 63, 71, 103.
Cf. pp. 116f.
The discussion in this section will be based on Russell’s views as set forth in the following works: P. of M., (pp. 53-65, 502); “On Denoting,” (L. K., pp. 41-56); P. M., (pp. 66-71); P.L.A. (L.K., pp. 232L, 241-254); I.M.P., (pp. 167-180).
The distinction in question is that between what Frege calls “Sinn” and “Bedeutung.” This distinction is found in G. Frege, “Über Sinn und Bedeutung,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik, C (1892), 25–50. This essay has been reprinted, in English translation, in H. Feigl and W. Sellars (eds.) Readings in Philosophical Analysis, (New York, 1949), pp. 85-109.
p. 502.
Cf. Feigl and Sellars, p. 95.
L.K., p. 45.
P.M., p. 66.
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London, 1919), pp. 168-169.
L.K., p. 47.
I shall frequently employ this expression and the expressions “description-sentence” and “description-statement” as abbreviated forms of “propositions (sentences, statements) containing descriptive phrases.” All of these are to be taken as having the same meaning.
Cf. P.M., p. 67; P.L.A., p. 245; I.M.P., p. 174.
Cf. P.M., p. 67; P.L.A., pp. 244f; I.M.P., p. 174.
Cf. P.L.A., p. 244; I.M.P., p. 174.
Or at least may be taken to be a name here.
P.M., p. 66.
p. 177.
G. E. Moore calls attention to the vagueness of this phrase and concludes that Russell means that the three sentences do define what is meant by the original statement. (See his essay, “Russell’s ‘Theory of Descriptions’,” in P.B.R., pp. 175-225. See especially pp. 182t.) Russell’s reply to Moore (P.B.R., p. 691) does little to clarify this point.
Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity (Chicago, 1956), p. 33.
Both systems, for instance, would have greater formal simplicity than does ordinary language, in which some phrases of the form “the so-and-so” function as names whereas others do not. In Frege’s system all descriptions would be interpreted as names; in Russell’s none would.
In “Russell’s Philosophy of Language,” P.B.R., pp. 227-255.
Ibid., p. 241.
I bid., p. 243.
p. 243.
“Russell’s Mathematical Logic,” P.B.R., p. 130.
Several recent critiques of the theory of descriptions have suggested that it does not do justice to the manifold roles and functions descriptive phrases may have in ordinary language. (Cf. G. E. Moore, P.B.R., pp. 214ff., P. T. Geach, “Russell’s Theory of Descriptions,” in Margaret MacDonald (ed.) Philosophy and Analysis (Oxford, 1954), p. 34; P. E. Strawson, “On Referring,” Mind, LIX (1950), pp. 320-344.) In only some of its uses, it is suggested, can a descriptive phrase be analyzed in accordance with Russell’s formula for translating description-sentences. I shall not discuss these various criticisms, however; I am primarily interested in presenting an account of the essential features of Russell’s reconstructionism as a general analytic method. Therefore it would not be particularly apposite to engage in a detailed examination of the theory of descriptions and try to determine the particular respects in which it may or may not be adequate for the purposes for which it was formulated.
I shall use this expression to signify sentences containing class-symbols.
In the following discussion I shall not attempt to relate Russell’s analysis of class-symbols to his purely logical interests, even though these may have been, in some obvious sense, his primary concern. Since I am interested in his analysis simply as an additional instance of reconstructionism, I shall consider only those aspects of the analysis which have direct bearing on the ontological (or linguistic-ontological) issue of whether or not class-symbols are genuinely referential.
p. 82. My italics.
P. of M., p. 65.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 76.
Ibid.
P.M., p. 72n.
P. of M., p. 102.
Cf. P.L.A., p. 261.
Ibid.
P. of M., p. 104.
Cf. Ibid., p. 105. See also Appendix B.
See especially his “Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types,” American Journal of Mathematics, XXX (1908), 222-262. Reprinted in L.K., pp. 57-102. The theory of types is also discussed in P.M., pp. 37-65.
pp. 71-72.
Ibid., p. 72.
P.M., p. 79.
P.L.A., p. 261.
P.M., pp. 62-63. Russell is here assuming the validity of the Theory of Types.
I.M.P., p. 184.
Ibid., p. 182.
Philosophical Analysis, p. 30.
Ibid., p. 31.
Ibid.
p. 72.
As Russell uses the term, “metaphysical” usually means, roughly, “non-empirical.” In P.L.A. (p. 272) he says, “By metaphysical entities I mean those things that are supposed to be part of the ultimate constituents of the world, but not to be the kind of thing empirically given — I do not say merely not being itself empirically given, but not being the kind of thing that is empirically given.”
p. 16.
Cf. O.K.E.W., p. 58: “… the immediate facts perceived by sight and touch do not need to be proved by argument, but are completely self-evident.”
P.P., p. 22.
p. 140.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 141. Cf. O.K.E.W., pp. 84-85.
P. 85.
The “aspects” are, of course, the sense-data correlated with different points of view from which the “thing” may be observed.
Cf. M.L., p. 138.
Ibid. My italics.
Ibid., p. 151.
This does not mean, of course, that sense-datum words can simply replace physical-object words. The whole proposition must be recast.
“Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical Statements,” Mind, LIX (July, 1950), pp. 289-312.
Ibid., p. 290.
Ibid., p. 299.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 301.
Ibid., p. 312.
p. 82.
M.L., pp. 149-150.
It is to be noted, especially, that the problem which led Russell to treat physical objects as logical constructions arose because he was operating with a quite special theory of meaning based on a quite special theory of knowing (a “certainty” theory).
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Clack, R.J. (1969). The Uses of Reconstructionism. In: Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy of Language. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8874-6_3
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