Abstract
We have seen that in matters of education, pseudo-metaphysics has a positive, indeed indispensable, role in bringing our minds to maturity. The proviso being that the situation in which pseudo-metaphysics is allowed free play shall be one of antecedent strength and resilience. We have seen too that for a brief space Berkeley tacitly subscribed to this principle, as witness the dialectical composition of the body of the Principles and the Three Dialogues. But for a brief space only: elsewhere his attitude to pseudo-metaphysics tends to be simply negative and denunciatory; it is absurd and nonsensical, it encourages infidelity, it corrupts reason and common sense, and it hinders the progress of the sciences.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
The perennial argument about the status of “models” in the sciences has relevance here. Pierre Duhem, imbued with the age-old doctrine of “saving the appearances,” looked to an abstract network of phenomena as the goal of science. For Duhem, as for Berkeley in his characteristic mood, pseudo-metaphysics in any shape or form is scientific heresy; a “model” can at most be a ladder, a ladder to be cast down when the goal is reached. As against Duhem, others have risen up to defend the permanently constitutive character of “models.” Mary Hesse in Models and Analogies in Science (London 1963) summarises the current debate.
One defect of most attempts to formulate a philosophy of the sciences lies here: scientific endeavour is taken to be primarily individual; collaboration is mere addition. T. S. Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago 1962) is one of the few to do justice to the corporate resources of scientific work. Another common defect is to take the sciences too seriously: the leavening element of play is unrecognised.
Galileo was still, to a great extent, the fervent metaphysician. It was Galileo’s metaphysical enthusiasm, scarcely concealed in his Dialogues on the Two Great Systems, which precipitated his rupture with Urban viii. Newton’s Principia is written in Galileo’s language; but beneath the surface the two works are poles apart. Had Newton and Urban viii been thrown together there would have been no disruption.
Lord Radcliffe, The Problem of Power (1951 Reith Lectures). See especially Lecture 3.
The situation of the Universities is analogous; their recent evolution, under public pressure, is parallel to the recent evolution of the sciences under public pressure. A University Degree once had a moral connotation: it meant membership of a corporation with the lifelong rights, privileges, and duties of such membership. In recent times a Degree has come to mean a certificate of proficiency. The moral significance has withered. We have slid insensibly from Plato’s techne to tribe. This is not only a dreary state, it is perilous. For reform, when it comes in such situations, is likely to be very abrupt. (R. M. Hare in his Language of Morals II, 9 has some pertinent remarks on the logic of decline of standards.)
The notion of fictions is, in fact, of ancient lineage, although Berkeley seems to have been unaware of the fact: The doctrine of “saving the phenomena” in astronomy demands that explanatory devices be regarded as fictions. See Pierre Duhem’s ΣΩZEIN TA ФAINOMENA: “Essai sur la notion de Théorie physique de Platon à Galilée,” Annales de Philosophie chrétienne Sept. 1908.
See my Aquinas and Kant (London 1950).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1968 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ardley, G. (1968). The Exact Sciences. In: Berkeley’s Renovation of Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8872-2_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8872-2_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-8211-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-8872-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive