Abstract
Asylum is territorial when the state of refuge accords it to an individual upon its own territory, as distinguished from the non-territorial asylum which is accorded by the state in its embassies, consulates, ships, air-crafts, or military bases within the territory of another state. Territorial asylum is granted within the state to a fugitive coming from abroad. It may be noted here that the General Assembly of the United Nations has recently adopted a Resolution on Territorial Asylum’ which, although lacking the force of law,2 represents a measure of agreement by 122 member states on certain minimum rules of treatment for persons seeking to escape persecution.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2312 (XXII) on Territorial Asylum, Unanimously Adopted on 14 December 1967, in 62 American Journal of International Law 822 (1968). According to the Resolution, “… the grant of asylum by a state to persons entitled to invoke Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [Article 14: ”1. Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution, 2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.“] is a peaceful and humanitarian act and…, as such, it cannot be regarded as unfriendly by any other state,… ” The four articles of the Resolution read: “Article 1. 1. Asylum granted by a state in the exercise of its sovereignty, to persons entitled to invoke Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including persons struggling against colonialism, shall be respected by all other states. 2. The right to seek and to enjoy asylum may not be invoked by any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes. 3. It shall rest with the state granting asylum to evaluate the grounds for the grant of asylum. Article 2. 1. The situation of persons referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1, is without prejudice to the sovereignty of states and the purposes and principles of the United Nations, of concern to the international community. 2. Where a state finds difficulty in granting or continuing to grant asylum, states individually or jointly or through the United Nations shall consider, in a spirit of international solidarity, appropriate measures to lighten the burden on that state. Article 3. 1. No person referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1, shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier or, if he has already entered the territory in which he seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to any state where he may be subjected to persecution. 2. Exception may be made to the foregoing principle only for overriding reasons of national security or in order to safeguard the population, as in the case of a mass influx of persons. 3. Should a state decide in any case that exception to the principle stated in paragraph 1 of this article would be justified, it shall consider the possibility of granting to the persons concerned, under such conditions as it may deem appropriate, an opportunity, whether by way of provisional asylum or otherwise, of going to another state. Article 4. States granting asylum shall not permit persons who have received asylum to engage in activities contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”
The resolutions are passed by the General Assembly under power given to it by Article 10 of the United Nations Charter, according to which the “General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the Charter… and… may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.” Therefore, generally speaking, the resolutions of the General Assembly are in the nature of recommendation and are not legally binding. This is not to say that the General Assembly has no power at all to pass legally binding resolutions. The Charter itself gives such power to it in certain matters, for example, budget (Article 17), or appointment of the Secretary-General (Article 97). See also, in this connection, International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962 on “Certain Expenses of the United Nations,” I.C.J. Reports 1962, 151. However, generally speaking, resolutions of the General Assembly do not create binding obligations. See F. B. Sloane, “The Binding Force of a `Recommendation’ of the General Assembly of the United Nations,” 25 The British Yearbook of International Law 1, 31 (1948).
Exercise of such authority may incur responsibility on the part of the state so acting. See L. Preuss, “Kidnapping of Fugitives from Justice on Foreign Territory,” 29 American Journal of International Law 502 (1935); L. Preuss, “Settlement of the Jacob Kidnapping Case (Switzerland-Germany),” 30 American Journal of International Law 123 (1936); L. Preuss, “International Responsibility for Hostile Propaganda Against Foreign States,” 28 American Journal of International Law 649, 664 ff. (1934); C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law, 54 ff. (1928); J. B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vil. IV, s. 603 (1906); J. B. Moore, A Treatise on Extradition and Interstate Rendition, Vol. I, s. 191 (1891); E. Clunet, Questions de droit relatives à l’incident franco-allemand de Pagny -9 (1887). Seizure of an individual in foreign territory entails a duty to restore the prisoner and punish or extradite the offending officers. See M. Travers, Le droit pénal international, Vol. III, Nos. 1302, 1304 (1921); Villareal et al. v. Hammond (1934), 74 F. 2d 503.
See Chapter III, supra, on Basis for the Grant of Asylum.
See Chapter IV, supra, on The Individual’s Position in International Law With Respect to Asylum. See also L. Oppenheim, International Law, ed. by H. Lauterpacht, Vol. I, 618 (7th ed., 1948 ); A. Raestad, “Le droit d’asile,” 19 Revue de droit international et de législation comparée (3ème série) 114 (1938); E. Hambro, “Extradition and Asylum,” 11 Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht 106, 107 (1962); G. A. Smith, “The Right of Asylum,” 27 The Law Quarterly Review 199 (1911); F. Morgenstern, “The Right of Asylum,” 26 The British Yearbook of International Law 327 (1949); L. B. Koziebrodzki, Le droit d’asile, 79 (1962); A. E. Evans, “Observations on the Practice of Territorial Asylum in the United States,” 56 American Journal of International Law 148, 150 (1962). Lord Russell states in 1862 that “England, France and the United States have constantly, either by diplomatic acts, or by decisions of their tribunals, expressed the opinion that, upon principles of international law, irrespective of treaty, the surrender of a foreign criminal who has taken refuge within their territory cannot be demanded.” E. Russell on 10 June 1962, in Bruns (ed.), Fontes Juris Gentium, Series B, Section I, Vol. I, Part I, No. 1254 (1932). United States Secretary of States Webster stated that “although such extradition is sometimes granted, yet, in the absence of Treaty stipulations, it is always a matter of comity or courtesy. No government is understood to be bound by the positive law of nations to deliver up criminals, fugitives from justice, who have sought an asylum within its limits.” Moore, Digest, Vol. IV, 246. The United States Supreme Court observed in Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287, that “[t]he principles of international law recognize no right to extradition apart from treaty. While a government may, if agreeable to its own constitutions and laws, voluntarily exercise the power to surrender a fugitive from justice to the country from which he has fled, and it has been said that it is under a moral duty to do so, the legal right to demand his extradition and the correlative duty to surrender him to the demanding state exist only when created by treaty.” The U.S. Supreme Court said in U.S. v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, that “[p]rior to these treaties and apart from them it may be stated… that there was no well defined obligation on one country to deliver up fugitives to another, and though such delivery was often made it was upon principles of comity, and within the discretion of the government.”
P. Fauchille, Traité de droit international public, Vol. I, 757 (8th ed., 1922); A. N. Mandelstam, Les dernières phases du mouvement pour la protection internationale des droits de l’homme, (Extrait de la Revue de droit international, no. 4, 1933, et no. 1, 1934), 4 (1934); A. Raestad, “Statut juridique des apatrides et des réfugiés,” 1 Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international 32 (1936); J. B. Scott in his preface to O. J. Janowsky and M. M. Fagen, International Aspects of German Racial Policies, vi (1937); L. W. Holborn, “The Legal Status of Political Refugees, 1920–1938,” 32 American Journal of International Law 680, 681 (1938).
As the German Reichsgericht stated in 1899, there is no doubt that the provisions of the extradition treaties are concluded less in the interest of the criminal than in that of the right of asylum and the jurisdiction of the treaty states. 32 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen 425.
For example, this seems to be the situation in the United States of America. There, as the U.S. Secretary of State Gresham stated in 1895, “[Oa the absence of Treaty and an Act of Congress authorizing it, the President has no authority to cause the arrest and extradition to another country of an alleged criminal found within the jurisdiction of the United States.” Moore, Digest, Vol. IV, 252. See also the statement by Secretary of State Olney, in Moore, Digest, Vol. IV, 252; the statement of Secreary of State Hughes, in United States Foreign Relation Reports, 1923, Vol. II, 705; the United States Supreme Court in Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 276.
For example, Koziebrodzki observes that “L’exercice du droit d’asile ne se confond pourtant pas avec l’admission par l’Etat des étrangers en général. En accordant asile l’Etat prend en considération la situation spécifique de l’étranger, persécuté ou poursuivi dans son pays pour son activité ou ses opinions politiques. Ce caractère insolite de personne sollicitant l’admission impose à l’Etat un devoir moral positif de l’accueillir.” Koziebrodzki, d’Asile, 80–81.
Cf. International Court of Justice, Colombian-Peruvian Case, Judgment of November 20th 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, 263, 274–275.
The Lotus Case, Permanent Court of International Justice, 1927, P.C.I.)., Series A, No. 10.
Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I, 618.
U.S.C., ss. 960, 962; 22 U.S.C., s. 461; 8 U.S.C., s. 1251 (a) (17). See also U.S. v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887); G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. I I, 336–342 (1940–44).
A. E. Evans, “Observations on the Practice of Territorial Asylum in the United States,” 56 American Journal of International Law 148, 154–157 (1962). See also the point made by U.S. Ambassador Bonsal to President Dorticos of Cuba in October 1959. 41 Department of State Bulletin 715, 716 (1959).
A provision excluding political offenders from extradition was first included in the Franco-Swiss Treaty of 1831. The Belgian Extradition Law of 1833 seems to be the first municipal legislation providing for the non-extradition of political offenders. See P. Weis, “Territorial Asylum, ” 6 Indian Journal of International Law 173, 187 (1966).
See, for example, E. Hambro, supra note 5, at 107–108.
See, for example, E. Hambro, “Auslieferungspflicht und Asylrecht,” 73 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 658, 658–659 (1961); E. Hambro, supra note 5, at 107; Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I, 705–707 (8th ed.); H. Lauterpacht, “The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes,” 21 The British Yearbook of International Law 58, 88 (1944); F. Morgenstern, supra note 5, at 342; P. Weis, “Territorial Asylum,” 6 Indian Journal of International Law 173, 187, 188 (1966).
F. Morgenstern, supra 5, at 344; International Law Association, Committee on the Legal Aspects of the Problem of Asylum, Report of the Committee, Appendix I, Statement by the Legal Advisor, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [P. Weis], 1964 Report of the Fifty-first Conference Held at Tokyo 283, 288–289.
Thus, according to the Harvard Research in International Law, although most treaties and municipal enactments use mandatory form, “[t]here is no reason why a state should be precluded from surrendering, if it so chooses, a person sought for a political offense. It may well be that some states, because of close associations or because of the close similarity of their political institutions, would find the extradition of political offenders desirable.” Harvard Research in International Law, Extradition, 29 American Journal of International Law, Supplement 15, 110 (1935).
For example, the German Reichsgericht stated in a decision in March 1926 that there is no generally recognized rule of international law which holds that extradition because of a political offense is never permissible, whatever be the viewpoint of the state from which extradition is requested, and that extradition contrary thereto has no legal effect. 60 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen 202 (1926).
For example, see the European Convention on Extradition, 13 December 1957, signed by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and Turkey, Article 3 (2), European Treaty Series No. 24; the Belgium Extradition Agreement, 17 January 1958, Article 3, BGBI. 1959, Teil II, No. 2, 27; the Austrian-German Extradition Agreement, 22 September 1958, BGBI. 1960, Teil II, No. 50, 1341.
C. C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly As Interpreted and Applied by the United States, Vol.1, 230 (2nd ed., 1945); E. M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad or the Law of International Claims, 48–49 (1915); Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I, 630 (7th ed.); C. de Boeck, “L’expulsion et les difficultés internationales qu’en soulève la pratique,” 18 Recueil des Cours 443 (1927); G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. III, 690–705 (1942). See also Reports from the Law Officers of the Crown, 1898, at 92, 95; United States Foreign Relations Reports, 1895, Vol. II, at 1801–1802; United States Foreign Relations Reports, 1908, at 775 ff. See, further, Vaaro v. The King, I.D.L.R. 359 (1938): Attorney-General v. Cain, A.C. 542 (1906); Fong Yue Tung v. United States, 149 U.S. 689.
Borchard, Diplomatic Protection, 57; J. B. Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party, Vol. IV, 3333–3359 (1898); J. B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. W, 67–142 (1906); Hyde, International Law, Vol. I, 232; Hackworth, International Law, Vol. III, 690–705; M. M. Whiteman, Damages in International Law, Vol. I, 418–514 (1937); C. de Boeck, supra note 27, at 591–644.
Hyde, International Law, Vol. I, 234; Hackworth, International Law, Vol. III, 690; Moore, Digest, 69, 33; C. de Boeck, supra note 27, at 532–577; J. I. y Puente, “Exclusion and Expulsion of Miens in Latin America, ” 36 American Journal of International Law 252, 257, 263 (1942).
For example, see U.S. ex rel. Hudak v. Uhl, 20 F. Supp. 928; Rex v. Home Secretary ex parte Duc de Château Thierry, 116 L.T.R. 226; the Kondiantz case (1938), Dalloz hebd., 1939, 3; Mavrommatis v. Public Prosecutor (1934), Dalloz hebd., 1935, 7; Netz v. Chuter Ede, 1 All E.R. 628 (1946); Hirsch v. Somerville, 2 All E.R. 27 (1946). For Swiss practice, see Schindler, Die Fremdenausweisung aus politischen Gründen nach schweizerischem Bundesstaatsrecht, 929 (1930).
For example, De Marigny v. Langlais (1948), 5 Criminal Reports, Canada, 256, at 261.
For example, In re Morphy, Dalloz, Recueil périodique et critique de jurisprudence, 1885, Part 3, at 9.
For example, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service has a policy whereunder “[p]ersons found to be illegally in the United States… who satisfactorily establish that they are political refugees are given every opportunity by this Service to depart from the United States and adjust their immigration status, if they desire permanent residence in this country, or to effect departure from the United States to some other country before resort is had to the institution of deportation proceedings.” 47 Columbia Law Review 654 (1947). Thus, certain Mexican rebels, declared inadmissible by a Board of Inquiry under the Immigration Statutes, were not sent back to Mexico as long as this implied danger to their lives. United States Foreign Relations Reports, 1929, Vol. III, at 388. Judicial review seems to be permitted in such cases. Thus, as decided in United States ex rel. Hudak v. Uhl (1937), “[t]he deportation of aliens is not a subject for review by the Court, unless, perhaps, where it is made clear that deportation to the country named in the order would almost certainly mean death to the alien guilty only of political offenses, and even then interference could only be justified upon the ground that the Secretary of Labor was guilty of such gross abuse of discretion as to raise a question of law.” Annual Digest, 1935–37, Case No. 161. Similarly, in England, generally speaking, refugees are not expelled to countries where they would be persecuted. Thus in Re Zausmer (1911), the Court of Criminal Appeal did not recommend expulsion of the defendant on the ground that, if sent back to Russia, he would be punished for desertion. 7 Crim. App. Rep. 41. This seems largely to be a matter of the executive policy, and is a matter for the discretion of the Home Secretary under the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 and the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act of 1919. The Court of Appeal held in Rex v. Home Secretary ex parte Duc de Château Thierry (1917), “[a]ssuming, therefore, that the respondent proved that he was a political refugee and unfit for military service, such facts would not affect the validity of the order, but would only be matters to be considered by the Secretary of State as affecting the exercise of his discretion.” 117 L.T.R. 226. According to the Court, although the Home Secretary could not send an alien to a particular country, he could place him on a ship which would inevitably take him to its final destination. Ibid. See also Papadimitriou v. Inspector-General of Police and Prisons (1944), 11 P.L.R. 431. So far as the policy is concerned, the Attorney-General declared in 1914 that the government did not intend to enforce the Aliens Restriction Act against political refugees. The Home Secretary stated in 1949 in the House of Commons that although he could not give a general undertaking not to deport opponents of the Franco régime to Spain, he would have regard to “what is likely to happen to a person because of his political or religious beliefs in the country to which he is returning… The only place to which I can legally deport a person is his country of origin, but I try to help these people as far as I can by allowing them to get out under their own power.” Weekly Hansard, No. 127 (13–19 May 1949), cols. 590–592. Although the matter of expulsion is one of executive discretion, it seems that the courts would interfere in case of abuse or misuse of this discretion. See Rex v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Sarno (1916), 2 K.B. 742; Rex v. Superintendent of Chiswich Police Station ex parte Sacksteder (1918), 1 K.B. 78. It seems that in France and Holland, too, refugees are not deported to their country of origin. F. Morgenstern, supra note 5, at 348.
For example, see Article 31 of the Cuban Constitution of 1940; Article 26 of the Constitution of Guatemala of 1945; a Swedish law of 4 June 1937, in R. NathanChapotot, Les Nations Unies et les réfugiés, 60, n. 4 (1949).
For example, according to Article 7 of the Provisional Agreement of 1936 as to the Status of Refugees coming from Germany, these refugees were in no case to be deported to the territory of the Reich. M. O. Hudson, International Legislation, Vol. VI, 376 (1931–50). Article 12 of the Treaty of Montevideo of 1939 provides that termination of asylum does not imply authorization to place the refugee in the territory of the pursuing state. OEA Documentos Oficiales, OEA/SER.X/7, Serie sobre Tratados No. 34, at 67–68.
For example, in Brazil, in re Esposito, although an expulsion order of an Italian anti-fascist was upheld, the court granted him habeas corpus to the extent of going where he desired once outside the Brazilian borders. Annual Digest, 193334, Case No. 138. In the United States, it was held in United States ex rel. Hudak v. Uhl that if deportation of an alien to his country of origin means his execution, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has the discretion of deporting him to some other country which will receive him. 20 F. Supp. 928. However, it seems that the fugitive cannot object to being sent to a country which, in turn, would permit his expulsion to his country of origin. See Glikas v. Tomlinson (1943), 49 F. Supp. 104. In England, the Home Secretary tries “to help refugees as far as I can by allowing them to get out under their own power.” See the statement of the Home Secretary in the House of Commons on 19 May 1949. Weekly Hansard, Vol. 127 (13–19 May 1949), col. 592.
For example, in England, “His Majesty’s Government observe the principle that an alien should not be deported except to the country of which he is a national. Accordingly, it is not the practice to deport stateless aliens resident in the United Kingdom.” Communication of the British Government to the Intergovernmental Advisory Commission on Refugees, 1934 Official Journal of the League of Nations 373. In the United States, it was held in Staniszewski v. Watkins (1948) that a stateless person must be released on habeas corpus as it is impossible to deport him. Cited in F. Morgenstern, supra note 5, at 349. Similar seems to be the situation in Belgium, where it was held in the case of Miedzinska (1935) that a stateless person violating an expulsion order could not be punished because it had not been proved that the state to which she had been expelled would receive her. Cited in ibid.
For example, in France, stateless persons can be expelled. See the case of Krichel (1924), decided by Conseil d’État, 52 (Clunet) Journal du droit international 709 (1925). However, refugees in violation of the deportation order are allowed to plead force majeure. But the proof required to establish such force majeure has often been quite stringent. For example, in the case of Rozoff (1936), the Cour de Cassation held that the proof that all countries around France had refused to admit the deportee was not sufficient to squash his expulsion because some more distant countries might be found which would accept him. Dalloz, 1936, Vol. I, 44. See also the case of Yacovlef f (1924), decided by the Conseil d’État. Dalloz hebd., 1924, at 477; the Court of Appeal of Paris in 1934, Dalloz, 1934, Vol. II, 113. But see the Tribunal de la Seine in the case of Zynger (1936) in Sirey, 1937, Vol. II, 43; the Court of Appeal of Toulouse in the case of Brozoza (1937), Sirey, 1938, Vol. II, 112; the Tribunal Correctionnel de Nice in the case of Nathanson (1935), Dalloz, 1936, Vol. II, 47. The French decree of 2 May 1938 (Article 11), the decree of 12 November 1938, and the Immigration Ordinance of 2 November 1945 protect an alien from expulsion who finds it impossible to leave France, although it is the executive, and not the courts, which decides whether the person is stateless and therefore entitled to the protection. See the Court of Appeal of Paris in the case of Rozenberg (1939), and the Conseil d’État in the case of Salom (1940), Gazette du Palais, 3 May 1940.
B. Trachtenberg, “L’expulsion des apatrides,” 63 Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 552 (1936).
For example, in the United Kingdom the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department stated in the House of Commons on 8 March 1957, “If, however, it is reasonable to suppose that the result of refusing admission of a foreigner would be his return to a country in which he would face danger to life or liberty, or persecution of such kind and extent as to render life unsupportable, he would normally be admitted, unless there were positive grounds for considering him undesirable.” Hansard, 8 March 1957, Column 747. The Home Secretary similarly stated in the House of Commons on 21 March 1963 that “[tlhe tradition of this country is that a person is granted political asylum if, in his own country, he appears to us to be in danger of life or liberty on political grounds or on grounds of religion or race.” Hansard, 21 March 1963, Column 594. In Switzerland, the Swiss Government made a statement on 1 February 1957 which declared that the right of asylum there was not merely a tradition but a political principle and an expression of the Swiss conception of freedom and independence. It asserted that since Switzerland was to follow an asylum practice in accordance with its tradition, it must be prepared to receive refugees on a broad basis. Report of the Federal Council 1 February 1957, in C. Ludwig, La politique pratique par la Suisse à l’égard des réfugiés de 1933 à nos jours, 388, 389 (1957). In Austria, the Austrian Federal Chancellor declared in the Parliament on 26 October 1955, after the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty, that the right of asylum in Austria would continue to remain in force to its full exent. National Council, Verbatim Records, Vllth Session, 80th meeting, at 3693.
French Conseil d’État in the case of Giloff (1936), Recueil général du droit international, 1937, Part III, at 19; and in the case of Kaboloeff (1941), Sirey, 1941, Part II, at 14.
LoNTS No. 3663. Generally speaking, it is the executive of a state which determines matters of national security and public order. Consequently, the French courts have interpreted Article 3 to mean that the executive can expel refugees when it deems it necessary. Conseil d’État in the case of Guéron (1939), Dalloz hebd., 1939, 325; Cour de Cassation in the case of Keledjian Garabed v. Public Prosecutor (1937), in Recueil général du droit international, 1938, Part HI, 69; Court of Appeal of Paris in 1937, Dalloz hebd., 1937, 228.
Text in 66 Journal du droit international 221 (1939).
UNTS 137. “Article 31. Refugees unlawfully in the Country of Refuge.
See text in Chapter VI, supra, accompanying notes 133–139.
Official Journal of the League of Nations 1326–27. See also Resolution of 24 September 1935, Official Journal of the League of Nations, Suppl. 1934/35, Resolutions of the 16th Assembly, 30–31; Resolution of 10 October 1936, Official Journal of the League of Nations, 1936, Resolutions of the 17th Assembly, 36–39; Resolution of 5 October 1937, Official Journal of the League of Nations, 1937, Resolutions of the 18th Assembly, 31–32.
For example, Switzerland replied that it “could hardly waive the right to compel Russian refugees who have been refused permission to stay in Switzerland or whose permission has been withdrawn, to leave.” The United States replied that “[t]he American Government is not in a position, under existing laws, to give effect to the recommendation in c. III regarding the admission or expulsion of aliens who may be refugees.” 1933 Official Journal of the League of Nations 854–57.
U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 8 (I), 12 February 1946. It may be pointed out here that the resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly do not have binding effect on states, except for certain matters specified in the U.N. Charter. See this Chapter, supra note 2.
Article 3. See the text of the Resolution in 62 American Journal of International Law 822 (1968).
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1971 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Sinha, S.P. (1971). Rights and Duties of States Granting Territorial Asylum. In: Asylum and International Law. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8856-2_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8856-2_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-8200-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-8856-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive