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The Individual’s Position in International Law with Respect to Asylum

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Asylum and International Law

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Abstract

It is needless to say that the individual seeking asylum has an interest in it. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the position which he has in international law with respect to it.

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Notes

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  2. See the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. 11 April 1949, on “Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations.” I.C.I. Reports 1949,174. The Court said that the United Nations “Organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane. It is at present the supreme type of international organization, and it could not carry out the intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international personality. It must be acknowledged that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged. Accordingly, the Court has come to the conclusion that the Organization is an international person. That is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State. Still less is it the same thing as saying that it is a ”super-State,“ whatever that expression may mean. It does not even imply that all its rights and duties must be upon the international plane, any more than all the rights and duties of a State must be upon that plane. What it does mean is that it is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.” I.C.J. Reports 1949,174.

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  3. For example, certain European states have made arrangements by international agreements to give the individual access to a legal system which prevails beyond the periphery of his state. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950, 213 United Nations Treaty Series 222; The Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Paris on 20 March 1952, 213 United Nations Treaty Series 262. See also, H. Guradze, Der Stand der Menschenrechte im Völkerrecht, (1956); M. M. Whiteman (ed.), Digest of International Law, Vol. 5, 248 (1965). The Convention, which became effective on 3 September 1953, sets forth 11 civil rights. An European Commission of Human Rights is established, which has power to consider any alleged breach of the Convention by a party to the Convention, referred to it by another party through the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. It has power to receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe from any person, nongovernmental organization, or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by a party of the rights set forth in the Convention, provided that the party against which the complaint is made has deposited a declaration with the Secretary-General that it recognizes the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions. An European Court of Human Rights is established in order to insure the observance of the provisions of the Convention.

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  4. This is sometimes called the object theory of the individual in international law. It was first propounded by Heilborn in 1896. See P. Heilborn, Das System des Völkerrechts, 58–211 (1896). See also G. Manner, “The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law,” 46 American Journal of International Law 428 (1952).

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  16. For additional situations where the individual has been treated more than an object of international law, see B Akzin Les problèmes fondamentaux du droit international public121 (1929); S. Basdevant supra note 10, at 528; C. Berezowski, “Les sujets non-souverains du droit international,” 65 Recueil des Cours 5, 6–20 (1938); H. H. L. Bellot, “War Crimes and War Criminals,” 36 Canadian Law Times 754, 876 (1936); H. H. L. Bellot, “War Crimes, Their Prevention and Punishment,” 2 Transactions of the Grotius Society 31 (1916); E. Bauer Die Kriegsverbrecher vor Gericht(1945); C. A. H. Bartlett, “Liability for Official War Crimes,” 35 Law Quarterly Review 177 (1919); A. Cavaglieri supra note 10, at 18, 169, 186; J. Dumas Les sanctions pénales de crimes allemands(1916); F. S. Dunn supra note 8, at 14; G. J. Ebers, Remarks, 1926 Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 38; C. Eagleton, “The Individual in International Law,” 40 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 22 (1946); G. A. Finch, “The Nuremberg Trial and International Law,” 41 American Journal of International Law 20 (1947); J. W. Garner, “Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War,” 14 American Journal of International Law 70 (1920); J. Hostie, “Examen de quelques règles du droit international dans le domaine des communications et du transit,” 40 Recueil des Cours 403, 488 (1932); J. Hostie, “Les affaires de communication devant la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale,” 22 Revue de droit international 105, 138 (1938); E. Hambro, “Individuals Before International Tribunals,” 35 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 22 (1941); N. Hall, “The Individual in International Organization,” 28 American Political Science Review 276 (1934); H. Isay, Remarks, 1926 Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 98; H. Isay, “Die Zuständigkeit der Gemischten Schiedsgerichte,” 53 Juristische Wochenschrif t 596 (1924); P. C. Jessup A Modern Law of Nations9 (1948); M. St. Korowicz, “La personnalité internationale de l’individu d’après la Convention relative à la Haute Silésie (1922–1937),” 6 Revue internationale française du droit des gens 5, 23 (1938); M. Lachs War Crimes An Attempt to Define the Issues(1945); A. D. McNair, “Collective Security,” 17 British Yearbook of International Law 150 (1936); A. Mérignhac, “De la sanction des infractions au droit des gens commises, au cours de la guerre européenne, par les empires du centre,” 24 Revue générale de droit international public 5 (1917); A. G. J. A. Mérignhac and E. Lemonon Le droit des gens et la guerre de 19141918Vol. It 563 (1921); Musso L’individuo e le Minoranze come Soggetti del Diritto Internazionale,32 (1938); Pallieri, Diritto Internazionale Pubblico,277 (1937); Romano, Corso,71; Rocco, Sistema di Diritto Internazionale,32 (1938); S. Rundstein, “L’arbitrage international en matière privée,” 23 Recueil des Cours 329, 347, 363 (1928); P. Schoen, supra note 5, at 411, 431; M. Siotto-Pintor, supra note 10, at 346.

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  90. Carlston observes that the “western world posits the individual as the centre of social action but it remains bound by its existing structures of social action which are those of group and organisations. When group membership raises issues of status or rank instead of role and performance, when group status determines individual rights and privileges, then we are confronted with a failure of society to free the individual for effective social action. For it is our philosophy of freedom that each individual shall be granted the greatest possible freedom of action, that this freedom of action becomes meaningful only through the opportunity to participate fully in the life of the society, and that it is the task of authority and of law not to frustrate this freedom, but rather to preserve its existence and to ensure that it is responsibly exercised.” Carlston, Law and Structures,73–74.

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  91. See, for example, M. R. Garcia-Mora, International Law and Asylum as a Human Right, 7–19 (1956).

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  92. For example, they posit that positivism denies the individual a standing under international law because he lacks procedural capacity to enforce his rights, and they contend that the validity of rights cannot be based on the procedural ability of enforcement. They suggest that the positivist theory is largely responsible for the unrealistic nature of many institutions of international law. Examples given include the concept that rights under treaties which are for the benefit of the individuals accrue not to the individuals, but to the states, or that when a state commits a tort against an alien, the claim is that of his state and not of himself, or the treatment of piracy under international law. Garcia-Mora, Asylum as a Human Right,11.

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  93. In a curious contradiction, Garcia-Mora states that “[t]he above views [that individuals are subject of international law as states are] have also been endorsed by the practice of nations in many occasions… It can be readily seen, therefore, that to contend that human rights have no standing directly under international law is to assume an attitude [which he has earlier stated as the positivist attitude] which can hardly be based on the practice of states as evidence of existing legal rules.” Garcia-Mora, Asylum as a Human Right,14. However, it appears to the present writer that if a practice of states has established an international custom, it would become a rule of international law within the positivist theory itself. The fact is, as demonstrated above in the text, that such a practice of states as Garcia-Mora wishes to obtain has not yet been so established.

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  94. See Statement by the Legal Advisor [P. Weis], Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in International Law Association, Committee on the Legal Aspects of the Problem of Asylum, Report of the Committee, Appendix I, 1964 Report of the Fifty-First Conference Held at Tokyo 283, 285–289.

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  97. For example, at the Eighth Session of the Human Rights Commission in 1952, Chile, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia jointly introduced a text which provided for the grant of the right of asylum to “all persons accused or persecuted because of their participation in the struggle for national independence or political freedom or because of their activities for the achievement of the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” The proposal denied the right of asylum to persons alleged to have committed acts contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.184. A proposal by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics called for a guarantee of the right of asylum to “all persons persecuted for their activities in defence of democratic interests, for their scientific work or for their participation in the struggle for national liberation.” The proposal denied the right of asylum in connection with prosecution based on the commission of war crimes or criminal offenses or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/ L. 191.

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  98. See, for example, comments made by the Government of Spain, U.N. Doc. E/CB.4/781, at 6–9; comments made by the Government of Sweden, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/781, at 9–10; comments made by the Government of the Netherlands, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/781/Add. 1 at 4; comments made by the Government of Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/781/Add. 1, at 13.

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  99. See Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Eight Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/699, at 40.

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  101. Examples include Albania, Constitution of 4 July 1950, Article 40; Bahama Islands, Constitution of 20 December 1963, Section 1; Bulgaria, Constitution of 4 December 1947, Article 84; Central African Republic, Constitution of 16 February 1959, Preamble; Chad, Constitution of 7 November 1949, Article 31; Dahomey, Constitution of 15 February 1959, Preamble; Denmark, Act No. 224 of 7 June 1952, Paragraph 2; El Salvador, Constitution of 7 September 1950, Article 153; France, Constitution of 4 October 1958, Preamble; Gabon, Constitution of 19 February 1959, Preamble; Germany, Basic Law of 23 May 1949, Article 16, Paragraph 2; Guatemala, Constitution of 1 March 1956, Article 48; Guinea, Constitution of 10 November 1958, Preamble; Haiti, Constitution of 19 December 1957, Article 36; Honduras, Constitution of 19 December 1957, Article 86; Hungary, Constitution of 20 August 1949, Article 58, Paragraph 2; Italy, Constitution of 27 December 1947, Article 10, Paragraphs 3 and 4; Ivory Coast, Constitution of 26 March 1959, Preamble; Jordan, Constitution of 1 January 1952, Article 21 (i); Kenya, Constitution of 4 December 1963, Section 14; Madagascar, Constitution of 29 April 1959, Preamble; Mali, Constitution of 17 January 1959, Preamble; Mauritania, Constitution of 22 March 1959, Preamble; Nicaragua, Constitution of 1 November 1950, Article 54; Niger, Constitution of 12 March 1959, Preamble; Northern Rhodesia, Constitution of 20 December 1963, Section 1; Norway, Aliens Act of 27 June 1956, Section 2; Poland, Constitution of 22 July 1952, Article 75; Rumania, Constitution of 24 September 1952, Article 89; Senegal, Constitution of 24 January 1959, Preamble; Sudan, Constitution of 23 January 1959, Preamble; Syria, Constitution of 5 September 1950, Article 50; United Arab Republic, Constitution of 5 March 1958, Article 9; Upper Volta, Constitution of 15 March 1959, Preamble; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Constitution of 5 December 1936, Article 129; Yugoslavia, Constitution of 31 January 1946, Article 31. See also Article 3 (1) of the European Convention on Extradition, 13 December 1957, 359 UNITS 273.

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  102. Statement of the Legal Adviser, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 95, at 288.

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  103. See S. P. Sinha, “Self-determination in International Law and Its Applicability to the Baltic Peoples,” in A. Sprudzs and A. Rusis (eds.), Res Baltica, 256, 267 (1968).

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  104. See E. Hambro, “Auslieferungspflicht und Asylrecht,” 73 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 657, 658–659 (1961); E. Hambro, “Extradition and Asylum,” 11 Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht 106, 107 (1962); Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I, 705–707; H. Lauterpacht, “The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes,” 21 The British Yearbook of International Law 58, 88 (1944); F. Morgenstern, “The Right of Asylum,” 26 The British Yearbook of International Law 327, 342 (1949); P. Weis, “Territorial Asylum,” 6 Indian Journal of International Law 173, 187–188 (1966).

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  105. Statement of the Legal Advisor, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 95, at 289. Weis here cites Oppenheim in support of this proposition. Oppenheim states “How Non-Extradition of Political Criminals became the Rule” and that “the principle has conquered the world.” Oppenheim, International Law (8th ed.), Vol. I, s. 333, 704–707. But the convenience of Weis’ suggestion, it seems, overlooks the basic proposition made by Oppenheim that “[t]here is, therefore, no universal rule of customary International Law in existence which imposes the duty of extradition.” Oppenheim, International Law,Vol. I, s. 327, 696. Thus, the issue of non-extradition of political offenders could not arise where there is no duty of a state to extradite at all due to the fact that there is no treaty imposing that duty on the state. Therefore, it might be too sweeping to claim the relevance of the issue for the general principles of international law.

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  106. F. Morgenstern, supra note 105, at 344. Cf. E. Hambro, “Auslieferungspflicht und Asylrecht,” 73 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, Mitteilung der Fachgruppe Strafrecht 180 (1961).

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  107. E. Dickinson, “Extradition,” 6 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 41 (1931); Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 American Journal of International Law, Supplement 32 (1935); Oppenheim, International Law,327, 696; J. B. Moore, A Digest of International Law,Vol. IV, 239 (1906); C. C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly As Interpreted and Applied by the United States,Vol. I, 1012–1063 (2nd ed., 1945); G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law,Vol. IV, 1 (1941).

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  108. Annual Digest, 1919–20, Case No. 185.

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  109. Annual Digest, 1929–30, Case No. 167. See also, Annual Digest, 1935–37, Case No. 165.

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  110. It was held that the accused did not have any right to be precluded from the surrender for facts which had not been provided for by the Franco-Belgian Convention on extradition. It was sufficient that both French and Belgian law punished the offenses at the time they were committed. 36 Revue critique de droit international privé 435 (1947).

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  111. Lord Simon, the Lord Chancellor, said in the House of Lords on 7 October 1942, “There is not, as many people suppose, any private right, recognised in international law, called the right of asylum. That is to say the fugitive — the criminal who manages to get over the border into some other country — is not thereby entitled to claim to stay there… It is perfectly competent for the country which receives the criminal, whether there is an extradition treaty or not, if that country thinks it will be fulfilling its duty to the world, or if its conception of public requires and justifies it, to hand the criminal over.” Hansard, Parliamentary Debates$15th Series, House of Lords, Vol. 124, col. 582.

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  112. Chandler v. United States (1948), 171 F. 2d 921.

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  113. A leading case is the dispute in 1935 between Germany and Switzerland involving the kidnapping of a German refugee, Jacob Saloman, from Switzerland. See Preuss, in 29 American Journal of International Law 532 (1935); 30 American Journal of International Law 125 (1936).

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  117. United States v. Insull, Annual Digest, 1933–34, Case No. 75. See also United States v. Unverzgat (1924), 299 F. 1015.

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  118. Chandler v. United States (1948), 171 F. 2d 921.

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  119. Ex parte Lopez, Annual Digest,1933–34, Case No. 76.

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  120. For example, see the case of Jolis,decided by a French court of first instance, in Sirey, Recueil général des lois et des arrêts,Part ii, 105 (1934).

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  121. Annual Digest,1925–26, Case No. 234. See also Annual Digest,1929–30, Case No. 167; Annual Digest,1931–32, Case No. 164.

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  122. Under this principle, the requesting state does not try or punish the person extradited except for the offense for which he was extradited and, with the consent of the requested state, for offenses directly connected with it. The principle is usually embodied in extradition treaties. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 American Journal of International Law, Supplement 32 (1935). At times it is suggested as a principle of customary international law. F. Morgenstern, supra note 105, at 334.

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  123. The attitudes of the French courts (Annual Digest,1939–40, Cases No. 147, 148), the German courts (Annual Digest,1919–21, Case No. 182; Annual Digest,1935–37, Case No. 174), the Italian courts (Annual Digest,1935–37, Case No. 176).

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  124. For example, see Fiscal v. Samper (1934), decided by the Spanish Supreme Court. Annual Digest,1938–40, Case No. 152. The court felt that the “delinquents who take refuge in a foreign country relying on a legislation which promises them protection have acquired a true right, disregard of which would tend to weaken the law of nations and to introduce lack of confidence into international relations.”

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  125. For example, see the decision of the German Reichsgericht of 25 June 1929, Annual Digest,1929–30, Case No. 168.

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  126. See 34 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen 191 (1901).

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  127. For an examination of the extradition treaty as a source of rights for the individual, see H. F. van Panhuys, “Le traité d’extradition en tant que source de droits pour les individus,” in Le droit pénal international, Recueil d’études en hommage à Jacob Maarten van Bemmelen, 57 (1965).

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© 1971 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Sinha, S.P. (1971). The Individual’s Position in International Law with Respect to Asylum. In: Asylum and International Law. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8856-2_4

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