Abstract
Whenever we are tempted to condemn Coen as the annihilator of native shipping and trade in the Spice Islands we should remember that the policy he followed was precisely that laid down by his masters in Holland. Even though, later, they appear to have been somewhat disconcerted by the harsh way in which he had carried out their orders,1 their criticism of his conduct still amounted to no more than a light dressing-down.2 The memorandum embodying their views, which was drawn up by Hendrik Brouwer in 1612, and their letters to the Indies in the years following leave not the slightest doubt about the course of action which they advocated. Their letters of September and November 1614 3 already contained a detailed programme for preventing both foreign and native merchants from carrying on trade. At this time the competitive struggle with the Portuguese was still very much in the foreground, and Portuguese imports of Indian cloth into Indonesia were a constant source of irritation to the Dutch.4 Every means was to be used to put a stop to the transport of Portuguese freight in native ships and the Portuguese commenda trade in native shipping. It was equally essential to prevent the export of spices, and the idea of destroying spice trees cropped up at this time.5 As early as this, mention occurs of rivalry with the English. As far as the activities of Asian traders from outside the Indonesian area were concerned, the recently revived Chinese trade in the Moluccas (especially Chinese imports of cloth which were bartered for spices and money) was regarded with much suspicion by the Dutch.6 This trade, too, had to be prevented for, to the “ruination” of the United Company, the Chinese used to sell the spices (which they also obtained in the Javanese ports and which were even supplied to them by United Company servants in Bantam) to Portuguese and English buyers.7 United Company officials were only permitted to sell spices to the Chinese if these spices were to be shipped direct to China, or to countries which offered no competition to United Company sales.8
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Reference
Coen, Bescheiden IV, P. 539, 548.
Ibid., P. 539, 550. The criticism in 1622 (letter of 24th April, 1622 V.O.C. arch. 452) was primarily related to the war resulting from Coen’s action. The harsh punishment in¬flicted upon the Bandanese — even though this should have been “carried out with milder means” (“met gematichder middelen moeten geschieden”) — would serve as an example to others. Yet since “it will engender awe but no goodwill” (“t wel ontsagh, maar geen gunst sal baren”), care would have to be taken “not to fall into any new peril” (“in geen nieuw peryckel to vallen”). Considered retrospectively in 1630, the whole affair was still accorded only very mild censure (V.O.C. arch. 453, 27/8 1630). “The late General Coen was rather too energetic in those matters” (“d’Hr. Generael Coene salr was in die saecke al wat to animeus”). In their letters of 30th April and 6th May, 1615, in which they prescribed the policy to be adopted against the Bandanese, the directors advised exterminating the population in the event of resistance and destroying their large vessels. The inhabitants of the remote islands of Ai and Run, who could not be prevented from trading with foreigners, were to be moved to other islands and all the nut trees destroyed.
V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 45 (Sept. 2614); Ibid., fol. 63, 67, 73, zoo (Nov. 1614).
V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 45 (Sept. 1624).
V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 67 (21/zr 1614); Ibid., fol. 171 (6/5 1615); Ibid., fol. 286 (10/12 1615 ).
V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 160 (30/4 1615); Ibid., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 2r (11/9 1615); Ibid., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 59 (6/8 1616); Ibid., O.B. x618 I, fol. 4vs (10/5 1617). In the Moluccas the Chinese sold their silks to the natives as well as to the United Company (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 III, fol. 167, 7/5 1625).
V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 286 (Io/12 1615).
Ibid., fol. 263, 264 (30/11 1615).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 III, fol. 126 (resolution Reynst and council 10 /7 1615 ).
For the exclusion of the foreign Asian traders from the Moluccas see: Tiele, Bouw¬stojjen I, p. XVII, XXXII—XXXV; De Jonge, Opkomst IV, p. LXI; Colenbrander, Coen VI, p. 104, 209. Even De Jonge, who has quite a bit to say about Reael’s policy, has to admit that the latter’s views on the exclusion of foreign traders from the Moluccas bear witness to his keen insight.
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 2614, fol. 123 (1/8 1613 ); Ibid., O.B$11615, fol. 87vs (20/6 1614 ).
The arguments put forward by Kiers in defence of the starvation policy of Coen and the Gentlemen Seventeen are extremely weak (Kiers, P. 43, 82, 117, 119. 120, 121), and he still has to admit that the Dutch were incapable of providing the island inhabitants with food and shelter (p. 117, Izr). In the contract which the Bandanese signed with the United Company in 1605, which was less repressive as far as the Bandanese were concerned than the subsequent agreements, it was expressly stipulated that the Dutch had to provide them with food (Corpus Diplomaticum I, p. 38 (13/7 1605)).
Quotation: “nu dagelijks to zien [is], hoe veel de Nederlanders in dese Molukse handel van de Portugezen moeten leren,” V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1614, fol. 223 (x/8 26x3).
Quotation: “die men met autoriteit de tanden moest tonen,” V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1625, fol. 87vs (zo/6 16141; cf. O.B. 1614, fol. rzovs (1/8 1613 ).
Ibid., O.B. 16x6 III, fol. 4 (25/7 1615 ).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1615, fol. 87vs (20/6 1614); Ibid., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 226vs (20/8 16x8).
Ibid., O.B. 1615, fol. 87vs (20/6 x614).
Ibid., O.B. 1616 III, fol. 4vs (25/7 1615).
Ibid.
Ibid., O.B. 16í6 III, fol. 3 (25/7 1615 ). The proposals about not putting reals into circulation met with a response among the directors. It became established policy that cloves, nutmegs and mace could only be bartered for clothing and rice.
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 III, fol. 3vs (25/7 1615).
Ibid., O.B. 1616 III, fol. 3–4 (25/7 1615).
Ibid., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 7vs-8vs (21/7 1616); Ibid., O.B. 16x5 fol. 86vs (20/6 1614). The United Company could certainly not afford to sell the cloths at prices higher than it demanded from its own soldiers. The latter received part 6f their wages in kind in the form of cloths. If the soldiers sold some of these cloths to the natives at prices lower than those of the United Company it meant that they were actually competing with the United Company (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618, I, fol. 19, 19 /8 1616 ). Moreover, the soldiers’ demands for foodstuffs in exchange for the cloths did not encourage the natives to cultivate cloves (V.O.C. Arch., O.B. 16r7 III, fol. 52vs, (18/7 1616 ).
Coen, Bescheiden I, p. 83 (10/xx 1614 ).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 227 vs (20/8 16x8).
Ibid., fol. 228 (20/8 2618).
Ibid.
Ibid.
V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 492 (26/11 1616).
Ibid., fol. 453, 462 (26/,, 1616).
Ibid., fol. 463, 492, 499, 509, 512 (26/11 1616), 522–528 (12/12 1616); 571 (18/4 16,7); 577–579, 581, 582, 584 (12/4 1617); Ibid., 451, fol. 148 (31/Io 1617 ); Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 363 (26/11 x6,6). Besides disapproving of his policy towards the English and the natives, Reael’s critics blamed him for not taking steps against Lemaire’s fleet, for the unsuccessful voyage to the Philippines, for his uneconomical administration, for building more forts and creating more functions than were needed, and for entertaining too lavishly. Moreover, Reael had previously aroused the irritation of United Company servants in the commercial grades, who thought that he gave preference to the officers because he seemed to get on better with the latter. (V.O.C. arch., O.B$116,5, fol. 63, 68vs (12/8 1614 ).
Coen, Bescheiden II, p. 174–175 (7/11 16x6).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 33vs (7/4 x616); Coen, Bescheiden I, p. 127 (22/Io x615).
Coen, Bescheiden II, p. 193 (7/1x 16,6).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 I, fol. 3 (,o/5 16, 7 ).
Ibid., fol. 5 (to/5 1617).
Ibid., fol. 8 (ro/5 16,7).
Quotation: “wat aengaet d’inlantsche negotianten, mettertijd sal ‘t oock wel sijn,” Colenbrander, Coen VI, p. rx8.
Quotation: “om onse beste te doen, soo de vreemden te weeren,” V.O.C. arch., O.B. 16x8 III, fol. 3vs. (6/1618).
Ibid., O.B. 1618 II, fol. 3 (10/1617).
Ibid., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 215 vs (11/1618).
Ibid., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 6vs (10/ 1616 ); Ibid., O.B$11618 I, fol. 8vs (10/5 1617 ).
Quotation: “’t schijnt de grote wijsheyt een mensch soo wel abusere, als onverstant doet dolen,” Coen, Bescheiden II, p. 191 (7/I, 16, 6 ).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 253 (20/8 x618).
Ibid., fol. 253 (20/8 16,8); Ibid., O.B. x618 I, fol. x79 (6/5 16x8).
Ibid., O.B.,6x8 I, fol. 197 (26/5 1617 ).
Ibid., O.B. 1618 I, fol. 179 (6/5 x618); Ibid., fol. 197vs (26/5 1617).
Ibid., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 253vs (20/8 26, 8 ).
Ibid., fol. 253 (20/8 1618 ); Ibid., fol. 222 (20/8 1618).
Ibid., O.B. r6x8 I, fol.,97vs, 198 (26/5 26,7).
Ibid., fol. 295, 295 VS (26/5 1617).
Ibid., fol. 295vs (26/5,617).
Quotation: “woudapen,” Ibid., O.B. 1618 III, fol. 357vs (14/8 16,7). The Rev. S. Danckaerts, who took the pulpit in Amboina in 16x8 was a much better type of man. See C. A. L. van Troostenburg de Bruyn, Biographisch woordenboek van oost-Indische predikanten.
V.O.C. arch., O.B. /6z6 II, fol. 296vs (10/3 1616 ); Ibid., O.B. 16x7 I, fol. x,ovs (10/31616)
Ibid., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 253 (20/8 16x8).
Ibid., fol. 253vs (20/8,6x8).
Ibid., O.B. 26,9 I, fol. x80 (615 16x8).
Ibid., fol. 180 (6/5 16,8).
Ibid., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 224vs (20/8 x618).
Ibid., fol. 225 (20/8 1618).
Quotation: “dat se de duivel met sijn moer wel souden int Tant ha1en om ons te plagen en te verdrijven,” Ibid., 1629 I, fol. 179vs, 180 (6/5 1618 ).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 224vs (20/8 x618).
Ibid., fol. 2z7vs (20/8 1618).
Ibid., O.B. x618 I, fol. 197vs (26/5 1617 ).
Ibid., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 253 (20/8 1618).
Ibid., fol. 225 (20/8 x618).
Tiele, Bouwstoffen I, p. XXXIII.
V.O.C. arch. 4288, fragment letter l’Hermite c. I6oo.
For the relative value of husked and unhusked rice, see a letter from Jan Jacobsz in Macassar, dated 13th February x608. In connection with the purchase of rice from the king of Macassar it is stated that 2 gantang of unhusked rice are equivalent to x gantang of husked rice.
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 224vs (20/8 1618).
Ibid., O.B. 1619 I, fol. 182vs (10/6 1618).
Ibid.
Ibid., fol. 180 (6/5 1618).
Ibid., O.B. 1618 I, fol. 25vs (17/3 1617).
Ibid., I, fol. 8 (10/5 16x7).
Ibid., fol. 223 vs (10/5 1617); Ibid., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 59 (6/8 1626 ). Dedel considers that if trading is eliminated it will be impossible for the Company to supply the natives with everything that the foreign traders used to bring. For Reael’s views on Cornelis Dedel, see V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 I, fol. roes (2/7 1617 ).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 28 (22/9 x616).
Tiele, Bouwstoffen I, p. XXXIV; Ibid. II, p. IX. It is odd, therefore, to see Kiers postulate the thesis that free trade was not possible in those regions because of the absence of legal authority. According to him, trade was only made possible by the weapons and fortresses of the Dutch, which stabilized the elements of conflict among the native peoples (Kiers p. 12, 13, 67, 14); a most noxious stabilization as far as the natives themselves were concerned.
Tiele, Bouwstoffen I, p. L.
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 252–253vs (20/8 1618).
Ibid., fol. 223vs (20/8 1618 ), cf. also “Verhaal oorlogen in Indic,” Kroniek Historisch Genootschap 1871, P. 499. Here the depopulation is chiefly attributed to the fact that the inhabitants went to live on other islands. For the population of Batchan, see also p. 98.
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 222vs-223 (20/8 16x8).
Ibid., fol. z23vs (20/8 z6z8).
Ibid., fol. 224 (20/8 1618).
Ibid., fol. 252vs-253 (20/8 16x8).
Ibid., fol. 225–225vs, 226 (20/8 1618).
Ibid., fol. 226 (20/8 1618).
Grondig Verhaal Amboyna.“ Kroniek Historisch Genootschap 1871, P. 352, 436.
Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 564 (x7/9 1622 ).
V.O.C. arch. 453 (28/8 2629).
Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 377 (25/Io /617); Ibid., p. 387 (3/II 1617); V. O.C. arch. 451, fol. 128, 229 (25/Io 1617); Ibid., fol. 145 (31/Io 2617 ).
V.O.C. arch. 452, fol. 128 (25/ro 16x7).
Quotations: “te doene, hetgeen ons schijnen sal de Compagnie oorbaer te vereysschen,” and “des coopmans profite niet soo seer in het hoogh venten van synne waren als in de grooten afftreck ende slete gelegen is,” V.O.C. arch., O.B. x619 II, fol. 227vs (zo/8 1618 ).
Coen, Bescheiden II, p. 283, 284 (20/11 1617); Ibid. p. 296 (30/11 1617 ); Ibid., I, p. 262 (22/8 26,7); Ibid. p. 364 (26/7 x618); Ibid., II, p. 461, 462 (24/Io 1618).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 53vs (18/7 16x6); Ibid., 45x, fol. 151, 164 (31/10 1617 ). Shortly before his departure for Holland, Van der Hagen, as the oldest member of the Council, was appointed by the Gentlemen Seventeen as Coen’s successor in the event of the latter’s decease (V.O.C. arch. 451, fol. x65, 166, x68, 2 /11 1617 ).
Rapport oost-Indië,“ Kroniek Historisch Genootschap 1871, p. 326 et seq.; Colen¬brander, Coen VI, p. 4.
Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 610–623. Colenbrander ascribes these marginal notes to Reael, but the authorship of the latter has already been called into question by H. Winkel-Rauws Nederlandsch-Engelsche samenwerking in de Spaansche wateren 1625–1627, p. 58, note 37 - although she does more to refute Gerretson’s reasoning than to produce positive arguments in support of the opposite view. It may be pointed out here, particularly in the light of the criticism which Van der Hagen had already levelled at Coen in the Indies, that after the former’s return to the Netherlands he had a great deal of contact with the directors of the Am¬sterdam Chamber, even though this was primarily for discussion of a personal matter (Langeraad, “Eenige mededeelingen van Arent van Buchel,” Navorscher XXX [1897], p. 629). In these personal affairs Van der Hagen could count on the support of Arent van Buchel, the well-known director of the Amsterdam Chamber. In the notes made by Van Buchel on the meetings of the Chamber he speaks of Van der Hagen as the princi¬pal figure among those who were opposed to Coen’s reappointment. Coen’s opponents considered the reappointment “t selve ondienstich to wesen, overmits hij (Coen) is in de haet, soo van de Engelschen als Javanen, mette welcke onder sijn gouvernement wey¬nich vrientschappe stont to verwachten” [“actually useless, since he is hated by both the English and the Javanese, from whom, under his government, little friendship could be expected”] (M.S. Buchelius, Aanw. 1882, A VI, 8. A.R.A. p. 66, minutes of the meeting of the Amsterdam Chamber 11/3 1621). Coen could still count on the majority of the directors being in agreement with his policy, however, even though there was increasing opposition to his “hoge concepten en exorbitante eisen” [“highflown ideas and exorbitant demands”] (Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. $36 [14/1 1622]; Ibid., IV, p. 552, 8/9 1622). Van Buchel and Van der Hagen must have been in very close touch with each other (Langeraad, Navorscher 1897, p. 628, 629, 630). Van Buchel’s papers contain comments on East Indian affairs which are also expressed in the letters of Van der Hagen, for example, their views on the contrast between the care taken of the natives by the Jesuit fathers and by the Dutch protestant ministers (Langeraad, p. 634). Unlike Van der Hagen, when Reael returned to the Netherlands he kept right in the background. At first he made no statement at all, either orally or in writing (Langeraad, p. 624). The report, based upon an interview with Reael which was finally delivered to the assembly in 1620 by Willem Boreel, the Company lawyer, is a purely factual account of events which had taken place, and does not contain a single word of criti¬cism (Langeraad, p. 643). Reael was not offered a directorship and an attempt to have himself appointed ambassador to Venice was unsuccessful. After that, Reael must have concentrated entirely on his literary work. He left Amsterdam and settled elsewhere (Winkel-Rauws, p. 57, 58). All this is clear evidence that he did not wish to create a sensation. Is it likely that this man would utter pointed criticism of the sort to be found in the marginal notes? There is more to indicate that Van der Hagen was the author, but perhaps the marginal notes reveal a better knowledge of the whole working of the Company than Van der Hagen, who was not a director, could have had. But contact with this militant figure must have influenced his supporters among the direc¬tors to no small extent.
Quotation: “’t was een groot misverstant dat getracht was succes met deucht of goet¬doen to beteren;” voortaan zouden de inheemsen “met harde sporen bereden moeten worden,” Coen, Bescheiden II, p. 461 (24/xo 1618 ).
Quotation: “men heeft een keten begonnen to trecken, daervan d’ene schaeckel den ander mede sleypt,” V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1615, fol. 90 (20/6 1614 ).
Quotation: “Europese gebruyck,” V.O.C. arch. 452 (Project van de handel 1626). “Grondig Verhaal Amboyna,” Kroniek Historisch Genootschap 1871, p. 414.
In 1656 Gentlemen Seventeen estimated European consumption at some 400,000 lbs of cloves per year (V.O.C. arch. 4462 1, extract from a letter from the Seventeen to Gov. Gen. and Council (13/10 1656)).
Ibid., P. 442.
Ibid., p. 146.
In 1636 Gentlemen Seventeen demanded 3oo,oo0 to 5oo,oo0 lbs of cloves from the East Indies (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 134 (24/9 1636))
Although there had been earlier expeditions to destroy plantings, systematic extirpation at regular intervals may be said to date from the time when the crews of the ships of the Nassau fleet hacked down the trees in 1625 (Van Dam, Beschrijvinge I, 2, p. 507).
V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 83 (13/9 1635); Ibid., fol. 156 (3/10 1637).
Ibid., fol. 5 (19/7 1633).
Ibid., fol. 306 (11/9 1640).
Quotation: “het redres van de Molukse en Amboinse zaken niet meer bij de Gouverneur General en Raden in achting is,” V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 307 (x1/9 1640 ).
Ibid., fol. 297–298 vs (1x/9 1640).
Ibid., fol. 250vs (12/9 1639).
Ibid., fol. 151vs (3/10 1637).
Ibid., fol. 137vs (26/11[1636); Ibid., fol. 144 (26/3 1637 ); Ibid., fol. 15xvs (3/10 1637).
Ibid., fol. 345vr, 346 (5/9 1641).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1633 II, fol. 41. Report on Ceram.
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I very., fol. 928 (Memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
The policy of the Seventeen in the Moluccas is most sharply defined in V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 298 (11/9 1640); Ibid., fol. 129VS (24/9 1636), fol. x50 vs (3/10 1637 ); Ibid., fol. 251vs (12/9 1639).
V.O.C. arch. 4462 (extract from a letter from the Seventeen to Gov. Gen. and Council, 9/10 2657 ).
Coen, Bescheiden, IV, p. 594 (21/9 1623, Vertooch).
V.O.C. arch., O.B., 1626 II, fol. 22 (27/10 1625).
Ibid., O.B. 1627 III. fol. 125 (13/12 1626).
V.O.C. arch. 453 (xo/8 1627).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I very., fol. 902 vs. (Memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
In 1632 the deficit in Amboina amounted to: fl. 86.292 (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1633 I, fol. 65, 1/12 1632).
Quotation: “principaelste conqueste,” V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 252 (12/9 1639 ).
For 1632 the deficit in Banda was fl. 50.714. For 1633 fl. 25.591. for 1634 fl. 35.539. If we select a year at random during the period 1630–1640, 1632 for example, the deficits in the Spice Islands are: for Amboina: fl. 86.292 for Banda: f1. 50.714 for the Moluccas: fl. 59.777 (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1633 I, fol. 65 (1/12 1632 ).
V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 84 (13/9 1635), Ibid., fol. 67 (21/4 1635).
Ibid., fol. 68 (21/4 1635).
Collectie Hope, No. 8396 (General State Archives) Overzichten van de tekorten in de specerijeilanden gedurende 1683–1750. (Review of deficits in the Spice Islands between 1683 and 1750 ).
V.O.C. arch. 4462 1 (13/x0 1656); Ibid., 453 (19/2 1632); Ibid., 454, fol. 209 vs (16/9 1638); Ibid., fol. 308vs (11/9 1640 ).
V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 19.(Nov. 1633).
According to Johann Sigismund Wurffbain, who visited Mocha in 1640, the decline of Aden was due to the fact that the Straits of Bab el Mandeb were difficult to navigate. For this reason the trading ship of the Turkish sultan began calling at Mocha instead of at Aden (Posthumus Meyjes, Wurf/bain II, p. 39). For a description of Aden in decline see Wurf/bain II, P. 34. The arrival of the Dutch ship certainly represented a threat to the trade of the Indians since the Dutch could ship goods more easily, safely, and quickly than they. The letters written by consul Cornelis Pauw in Aleppo about Dutch trade in Mocha contain no hint of the anxiety which Dutch merchants interested in the Levant trade were later to entertain about the competition which the goods shipped by the
The arrival of these ships was a very profitable affair for the authorities in Mocha since as much as 25,oo0 to 40,oo0 reals per ship might be paid in toll duties (Archives States General 7076, letter from Cornelis Pauw, 18th August, 1617).
In x6x6 the stocks of money brought back by the king’s ship amounted to some 200,000 to 300,000 reals and 16,oo0 to 20,000 Venetian ducats (Coen, Bescheiden I, p. 238; B & V II, “Van den Broecke”, p. 33). Van den Broecke quotes still higher figures, namely, 350,oo0 reals of eight and 50,oo0 golden Venetian and Moorish ducats. Mention of these Moorish ducats indicates that the stream of money did not come exclusively from the European part of the Mediterranean area. Moreover, the caravans from Aleppo brought specie to the amount of 2oo,oo0 reals of eight and zoo,oo0 Hungarian, Venetian and Moorish ducats, while some must also have been smuggled in (B & V II, “Van den Broecke,” p. 29). Braudel, who holds that Dutch and English supremacy was the main reason for the decline of the spice trade, considers the fact that about 1620 specie in the form of coins began to get scarce in the Mediterranean area a contributary cause, money being practically the only product which Europe exported to Asia (Braudel, p. 18x), but in 1616 quite considerable supplies of coinage were still being shipped. A king’s ship that arrived in Diu from Mocha in 1622 (B & V II, “Van den Broecke,” p. tot) brought a supply of 250,oo0 rupees (worth 24 stuivers [pence] apiece) destined for the merchants of Amadabat, Cambay, Surat, and other places. The fact that rupees are mentioned instead of European coins probably means that the figure quoted was the estimated value of the European specie after it had been re-minted into Indian coins. Re-minting generally took place in Amadabat (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 215vs, 22/10 1616 — “de ryalen vervoeren de Engelsen van Suratte naar Amadabath en laten er daar ropias van slaan, naardat er veel zilver uit de Rode zee komt, schijnt op de ropias nog eenige winst to hebben” (the English transport the reals from Suratte to Amadabat and have them struck into rupees, whereas much silver comes from the Red Sea there appears to be some profit on the rupees). In 1640, however, the Turkish merchants brought only “Moorish ducats” to Mocha (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1640 I, fol. 1309, 26/5 1639 ).
B & V II, “Van den Broecke,” p. 28, 33). In 1616 Van den Broecke recorded various ships of Indian origin in Mocha: r from Surat, r from Goga, 5 from Diu, 2 from Thouwel (Chaul?), 2 from Dabul, 1 from Goa, 2 from Calicut, 3 from Cananor, and x from Masulipatnam. Making due allowance for the fact that the tonnages are not known, these isolated data may be compared with a similar list from a Venetian source by Lane (p. 586) of ships arriving in Jidda (the port of Mecca) in 1565, namely: r ship from Dabul, 6 from Gujarat, 8 from Batticaloa (Baticalao), 3 from Calicut, z from Mordassi. Five ships from Achin arrived in Jidda iu 1565 as against one from Achin in Mocha in 1616. As far as the Indian towns were concerned, Dabul, especially, still had commercial dealings with Achin. The Dabul merchants. bartered Gujarati cloths in Achin for Sumatran pepper and Chinese goods, which they took to Mocha and exchanged there for reals. Coen estimates that as much as 200,000 reals was shipped out of Mocha to the above-mentioned Indian towns alone (Coen, Bescheiden I, p. 238).
As for the twenties, arrivals in Mocha in 1621 comprised 3 ships from Diu, 4 from Chaul, 2 from Dabul, and one from Cochin (Coen, Bescheiden VIIa, p. 770), while in 1628 there was one big ship in Mocha roads from Masulipatnam, another one from Diu, one from Cambay, one from Dabul, and xi) good frigates, probably from Malabar. There were also another 3 good “Moorish” ships, namely, one from Surat, one from Diu, and one from Chaul (Coen, Bescheiden VIIb, p. 1493 ). No more ships at all, however, came from the Malay-Indonesian area (Achin).
B & V II, “Van den Broecke,” p. 53. Foster, Journal of John Jourdain p. 205–208 (the cargoes of the Asian ships seized by Middleton).
Van den Broecke gives a comprehensive list of the goods dealt in in Mocha. (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 205–210).
A list of prices of commodities in Mocha, which has been preserved in Company records, supplies more exact figures. 1,50o to 2,oo0 bahar of pepper from the Malabar coast and boo to 1,oo0 bahar of pepper from Achin or Bantam could be sold there, further some 25 to 30 bahar of cloves, 5 or 6 bahar of mace and 30 to 40 bahar of nutmegs.
B &VII, “Van den Broecke,” p. 29.
Some of the spices and other wares were conveyed further overland by the caravan from Aleppo, which was made up of as many as x,oo0 camels.
Merchants and pilgrims used to gather together once a year in Aleppo and their numbers included not only people from the town itself and the surrounding districts but Persians, Tartars, and men of other nationalities as well. They all left for Mecca together and their caravans had fixed times of departure and arrival. First they went to Damascus, where they were joined by a similar group of merchants and pilgrims, and then, all together, they set off across the desert to Mecca. The governors of the provinces through which they passed provided the caravans with armed convoys to protect them from attack by Arab tribesmen. Food and water were also supplied through government channels. Another group of pilgrims and merchants used to congregate in Constantinople before crossing the sea to Cairo and then continuing overland to Mecca (Archives of the States General 7076, letter from Cornelis Pauw in Aleppo, 29th March, 1617 ).
See p. 134, note 140.
At first the United Company had no effect upon pepper exports from Malabar and Achin. It was only after 1638 when Company fleets began to blockade the coast of India that this circumstance combined with the Company’s growing influence on the west coast of Sumatra resulted in a reduction in the supplies. brought by Asian traders to Mocha. A contributory cause of the fall in supplies of spices reaching the Mediterranean in the first half of the 17th century must also have been the relentless war waged against the Portuguese at sea by the Dutch and the English. Every Portuguese ship and every native craft suspected of carrying spices belonging to the Portuguese was seized. Thus the spices which had been illegally diverted from the Cape route by the Portu¬guese did not fall into native hands either but came instead into the possession of the Dutch or the English and thus were shipped around the Cape after all.
Coen, Bescheiden I, p. 238.
Ibid., VII, P. 770.
Ibid., III, p. 269; Ibid., IV, p. 482.
Ibid., III, p. 326, 320 (14/5 1623); P. 940 (21/1 1623); Ibid., IV, P. 542 (14/4 2622); 563 (17/9 1622), 606 (21/ro 1623); Ibid., V, p. 843, 844 (28/8 1629 ); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1624 II, fol. 56.
The price of pepper actually fell so much that Coen wanted to send rice to Holland instead of pepper.
Heeringa, Bronnen Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel I, P. 497 (Cornelis Haga to the States General 25 /11 1623 ).
Quotation: “want bijaldien de heren desen handel op Mokha andre verletten ende selfs niet en doen, houde ick voor seecker, dat de specerijen alsdan uit de Nederlanden to meer derwarts (naar de Levant) sullen trecken ende dat de Levantvaerders in plaetse van t grote gelt, U.E. waeren sullen voeren,” Coen, Bescheiden I, p. 238 (10/12 1616 ).
Heeringa, Bronnen Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel I, p. loo et seq. In 1616 pepper which had first been brought to London went to Italy, Turkey and Germany ( Foster, Voyage o/ Thomas Best, p. 258 ).
English Factories 1624–1629, P. 351–353; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1640 I very., fol. 1309 (26/5 1639 ).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1640 I very., fol. 1310 (26/5 1639).
In the 17th century only Van den Broecke records the arrival in Mocha of an occasional ship from Achin in 1616 (cf. p. 223, note 135).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1642 I, fol. 4oo (12/8 1640).
In Jidda, the port of Mecca, trade with non-Moslems was prohibited on pain of death. In Mocha, where no such restrictions were imposed, the volume of trade at the beginning of the 17th century was considered to be much larger than in Mecca (Archives of the States General 7076, letters from Constantinople, Hadji Abraham report, 28th March, 1617).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 164r IV, fol. 168vs (Wurffbain report 12/Io 1640 ); Posthumus Meyjes, Johann Sigismund Wur//bain II, P. 43.
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1640 I, fol. 1309 (26/5 1639).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1641 IV, fol. 163 (12/xo 1640 ). Wurffbain estimates that, at the outside, some 5,oo0 pounds of cloves and 5,oo0 pounds of nutmegs could be sold, and barely 154 pounds of mace.
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 164x IV, fol. 163vs.
Quotation: “goede slach souden slaen,” Ibid., fol. r63vs.
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1707 III, fol. 2303 (x3/11 2706, report by Jan Josua Ketelaer).
The importance of the trading centre of Mocha should not be overestimated, however. In comparison with the Indian port of Surat or the Persian port of Gamron, the turnover of goods in Mocha was small. The Turkish merchants who brought the merchandise from the Red Sea did not possess much capital (according to Wurffbain, a merchant in Mocha with xo,oo0 reals at his disposal was the equivalent of a merchant in India possessing 2 to 3 lak (2oo,oo0 to 3oo,oo0 rupees), cf. Wurffbain in V.O.C. arch. O.B. 1641 IV, fol. 168vs. Nor did the Turkish merchants convert their capital into large stocks of one type of merchandise. Instead they laid out their money on small parcels of different sorts of goods. Cf. Van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society, p. 76, 77, who cites Mocha as an example of the primitive character and limited scope of Asian commercial traffic generally. Mocha was, however, of importance as a transhipment port on the route to the Mediterranean area.
Coen, Bescheiden VIIb, p. 1198 (26/10 1627); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1624 I, fol. 12 (3/x 1624 ); Ibid., O.B. 2624. I, fol. 211–21IVS (24/12 1623 ).
Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 489 (4/3 1621 ).
Ibid., IV, P. 490 (4/3 1621); see also Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, p. 103, 104. 163.. Coen, Bescheiden V, p. 21 (9/II 1627 ).
See p. 220.
Colenbrander, Coen VI, p. 104.
Ibid., p. 466 (Discours 1614).
V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 45 (Sept. 2614).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 II, fol. 3vs (xo/11 1617 ); Ibid., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 228 (zo/8 1618).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 2617 III, fol. 50vs (18/7 1616).
Ibid., O.B. x618 II, fol. 3vs (10/I1 1617); Ibid., O.B. 1618 III, fol. 7vs (21/10 2627). 171. Coen, Bescheiden III, p. xoo (31/ro 1621 ).
Ibid., p. 208 (5/II 262x).
Quotation: “’t zo vileyn ende schandelijck hadden gemaect, dat ons schamen ‘t selvige alhier punctuelijck te verhalen,” Coen, Bescheiden I, p. 709 (26/3 1622 ).
Ibid., I, p. 709 (26/3 1622 ); Ibid., III, p$1808 (13/x 1622); V.O.C. arch. 452 (23/Io 1623 ).
Coen, Bescheiden III, p. 1x4 (23/11 1621 ).
Ibid., p. 297 (31/1 1623).
Ibid., p. 297 (31/1 2623).
Ibid., IV, p. 602–609 (resol. 9/22 Oct. 2623 ).
Ibid., p. 577–601 (Vertooch van de Staat der Vereenichde Nederlanden in de quartieren van oost Indien - 21 sept. 1623).
Quotation: “d’openbare vijanden ende geveynsde vrienden,” Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 598 (21/9 2623 ).
Ibid., IV, p. 598 (21/9 1623), 617 (Nov. 1623).
Ibid., p. 599 (22/9 2623).
Ibid., p. 607 (2x/20 1623).
Ibid., P. 598 (21/9 1623 ).
Ibid., p. 610–623; Poincten van reglement ende redres van de staet van de Compagnie van Indien, Nov. 2623. See also Colenbrander, Coen VI, P. 332–340.
Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 616.
See p. 262.
Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 610–623.
Ibid., p. 634–638.
Ibid., p. 638–642.
Quotation: “daer en gedooght de Compagnie de Indiaenen niet [zozeer], maer de Indiae¬nen gedoogen de Compagnie,” Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 640.
Ibid., p. 639.
Ibid., p. 640, 641.
Ibid., p. 641. When it was a question of money loans, interest amounted to 50% to 60% (Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 641). According to the author of the “considerations,” Dutch capita¬lists could make as much profit by sending about fl. 1,oo0 to Asia as they could with fl. io,oo0 to fl. 12,oo0 in the Netherlands.
Quotation: “daer geldt is, daer valt de neeringe,” Ibid., IV, p. 641.
Ibid., p. 641.
Ibid., p. 610–623, marginal notes.
Ibid., p. 614.
Ibid., p. 621, 622.
Quotation: “Wil men se dootsmijten of te van honger laten sterven, daermede en waer men oock niet geholpen, want in een ledige zee, op ledige landen ende oock met doode mensen is gantsch geen profijt te doen,” Ibid., p. 619.
Ibid., IV, p. 660–664.
Ibid., V, p. 33 (9/11 2627); Ibid., V, p. 132 (3/x1 1628 ); Ibid., V, p. 649 (8/3 1628).
Ibid., V, p. 704 (13/10 1628 ).
Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakkaatboek I, p. 238.
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1625 I, fol. 142 (27/1 2625).
Ibid., O.B. 1626 II, fol. 25vs (27/10 1625).
Coen, Bescheiden V, p. 649 (8/3 1628 ).
V.O.C. arch. 453 (23/11 1631).
V.O.C. arch., 1631 I, fol. 37 (7/3 1631).
Ibid., 163x I, fol. 37 (7/3 1631).
Coen, Bescheiden VI, P. 444.
Quotation: “de vetste wayen, waer de Compagnie behoorde te grasen,” V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 2 (19/7 1633 ).
Quotation: “want als een van beijden moet lijden, ofte de Compagnie ofte de burgerije, soo is het verre beeter, dat de burgerije haer behelpt en hide laet ons dan doch eenmaal wijs werden en geen verteerde (= teerhartige) barmhartigheyt gebruycken.” V.O.C: arch. 453 (23/22 1631 ).
V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 3 (19/7 1633).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I, fol. 86 (25/22 1633).
Ibid., fol. 87 (15/12 633).
Ibid., fol. 86, 87 (15/12 1633).
V.O.C. arch., 1633 I, fol. 12 (1/12 1633).
Ibid., O.B. 1634 r very. fol. 887vs (memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
Quotation: “om de debile staet van de Compagnie als van de particuliere burgers tot een florissante constitutie te doen herleven,” Ibid., fol. 949vs.
Ibid., O.B. 1634 I very. fol. 948.
Ibid., fol. 891.
Ibid., fol. 916vs.
Ibid., fol. 948, 949.
Ibid., fol. 949.
Ibid., fol. 948vs.
Ibid., fol. 948vs, 949.
Ibid., fol. 949vs.
Ibid., fol. 949vs.
For Van Diemen’s attitude in respect of the free burghers see also Coolhaas, “Gegevens over Antonio van Diemen” BKI CIII, p. 532 et seq.
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1635 I, fol. 92 (27/22 1634).
V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 46vs (2/9 1634).
Quotation: “de aangeboren vrije aard van de Nederlanders soo strickte exclusie van handelingen ende gelimitteerde bepalingen niet verdragen,” V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1635 I, fol. 91 (27/22 1634 ).
V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 46vs (2/9 1634).
Quotation: “omme alle hoecken ende gaten gelijck de Chinesen te doorsnuffelen ende te onderzoecken, wat profijt daer te doen is,” Ibid., fol. 348 (5/9 1641 ).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1636 I, fol. 44 (4/1 1636).
V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 47 (2/9 1634).
Quotation: “van onse vyanden overrompelt te worden,” V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 264vs, 265 (12/9 1639 ).
V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 265 (12/9 1639); Ibid., fol. 347, 347vs, (5/9 1641).
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1641 I, fol. 53vs, 54 (30’12 2640).
Ibid., fol. 55 (30/22 1640).
See p. 228.
V.O.C. arch., O.B. 2641 I, fol. 55vs (30/rr 1640).
Quotation: “’t is zeker de Portugees deser landen natie beter als wij gouverneren con¬nen,” Ibid,, fol. 55vs.
V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 347 vs (5/9 1641).
Ibid., fol. 347vs.
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© 1962 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Meilink-Roelofsz, M.A.P. (1962). The Spice Monopoly of the United Company and Asian Trade in the Malay-Indonesian Area. In: Asian Trade and European Influence. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8850-0_10
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