Abstract
It must have been with great care that Plato made his decision to cast the Timaeus in the form of a myth. Scientific theories of his day were customarily stated in the language of finality and dogmatism. Over the course of years, Plato had found elements of value in many of these philosophies, but to none — rationalistic or empirical — did he yield his complete allegiance. In a sense, foes of each other could unite against him, for he opposed their common intransigence. The use of myth would soften the antagonism his views might arouse, and gain them a wider hearing. But his chief reason was doubtless beyond such considerations. He honestly believed that the study of natural science could be most fruitfully pursued by the use of ‘probable’ statements, which were capable of further test and analysis.
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References
It corresponds to what in other dialogues is often called ‘truth’, which is said to be accessible by means of dialectic. Cf. Rep. 6.484-6, 500-1, 7.532-3, Phileb. 58b-d.
Burnet, Greek Philosophy, Part I (London, 1924), pp. 340, 344.
Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon (Paris, 1930), pp. 13–15, 218-9, Robin, Greek Thought (London, 1928), p. 222.
As 59cd has been misinterpreted. Plato meant that the study of natural science provides a restful interlude to the intense discipline of dialectical thought.
Cf. 29cd, 44cd, 48d, 52bc, 56ab, 59cd, 68cd.
Rivaud, in Timée-Critias (Budé ed.; Paris, 1949), p. 14.
51d: διὰ βραχέων; 52d: ἐν χεφαλαίῳ.
51c: πάρεργον ἄλλο μη̃χος.
Frutiger, op. cit., pp. 222-3, Robin, Platon (Paris, 1938), pp. 192-3. Other definitions of myth given by Frutiger are: that it is a specific story which illustrates universal human experience, that it personifies natural forces, that it is the language of childish mankind before it has the facility of abstract language, and that it is the spontaneous product of primitive consciousness, often viewing the world anthropomorphically (op. cit., pp. 31-3).
Frutiger, op. cit., pp. 36, 191-6, 207-9.
Cf. Rep. 508d, 515c, 517a; Phaedo 65a, 67d, 82d, 83ab.
Cf. Rivaud, Le problème du devenir (Paris, 1906), p. 337.
Grube, Plato’s Thought (London, 1935), p. 167.
Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology (London, 1937), pp. 54–7.
Ritter, The Essence of Plato’s Philosophy (New York, 1923), pp. 270–1.
Cf. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, 330b16-9, note 2, Oxford tr. This evident reference to 35a is omitted by Bonitz in his list of Aristotle’s references to the Timaeus. Aristotle thought Plato’s’ soul’ was a ‘blend’ of the other two factors according to Joachim, Aristotle De Generatione et Corruptione, 330b16-9, note 2, Oxford tr.
Cf. Cornford, op. cit., pp. 60-6.
Taylor, A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (Oxford, 1928), p. 137, citing Plutarch (De Animae Procreatione, 1027d).
Although apparently Aristotle misunderstands this (De An. 407a20-22), his later conclusions show that he does not.
Cornford, op. cit., pp. 68-72. Cf. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 138-47.
Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy (London, 1888), p. 358.
Rivaud, Timée-Critias (Budé ed.; Paris, 1949), p. 89.
Nuyens, L’Evolution de la Psychologie d’Aristote (Louvain, 1948), pp. 231–2.
Nuyens, op. cit., p. 308.
Hicks, Aristotle’s De Anima (Cambridge, 1907), p. xliii.
Nuyens, op. cit., pp. 317-8.
See p. w.f., supra.
Hicks, op. cit., p. xxxvi.
Taylor, op. cit., p. 106.
This view is also followed by Taylor (op. cit., pp. 109-11).
In this argument, Aristotle has seized upon a weak straw. If it were true under all circumstances, the continuous thought of the Unmoved Mover would be precluded; thought would be punctilear and not continuous. Even in human experience, memory would be impossible.
Which of course is the goal of even human souls according to Aristotle himself (Nic. Eth. 1178b22-3; cf. Meta. 12.1072b25-9, 1075a5-11). The argument therefore has a point when applied to common experience, but is singularly inappropriate when compared with the ideal. In the latter case, soul would recurringly think the same thing, so the argument would prove the opposite of what he intended ! Circular motion would be regarded as aptly descriptive.
However, this criticism is made on the basis of Aristotle’s personal philosophy.
Taylor, op. cit., p. 154.
Burnet, Greek Philosophy, Part I (London, 1924), pp. 337-8. Rutenber, The Doctrine of the Imitation of God in Plato (New York, 1946), is also in accord with this view (pp. 4-17).
Cf. Tim. 29e, 41c. Other references to this subject are located in 42e, 69c, and 39de. In the latter case, imitation is of the Living Creature, the model, but through the model to God. For a detailed study of the general doctrine, see C. G. Rutenber, op. cit.
Taylor, op. cit., pp. 80-82, links the Demiurge with God, but makes a distinction between the Ideas and God, the former being absolutely unchangeable, and the object of thought rather than the process of thinking. A number of interpreters, notably Zeller, identify the Demiurge with the Idea of the Good (cf. Frutiger, op. cit., pp. 206-7 and notes), while others, following Brochard, regard it as a composition or effect of the Ideas (cf. Robin, Études sur la Signification et la Place de la Physique dans la Philosophie de Platon; Paris, 1919; p. 73). See Rivaud, Timée-Critias (Budé ed., op. cit.), p. 37.
Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago, 1933), p. 349.
The four causes are delineated in Phys. 194b23-195a3, 198a16-22; Meta. 1.983a 26-32.
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© 1954 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Claghorn, G.S. (1954). Aristotle’s Criticism of Soul. In: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s ‘Timaeus’. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8839-5_7
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