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Abstract

It must have been with great care that Plato made his decision to cast the Timaeus in the form of a myth. Scientific theories of his day were customarily stated in the language of finality and dogmatism. Over the course of years, Plato had found elements of value in many of these philosophies, but to none — rationalistic or empirical — did he yield his complete allegiance. In a sense, foes of each other could unite against him, for he opposed their common intransigence. The use of myth would soften the antagonism his views might arouse, and gain them a wider hearing. But his chief reason was doubtless beyond such considerations. He honestly believed that the study of natural science could be most fruitfully pursued by the use of ‘probable’ statements, which were capable of further test and analysis.

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References

  1. It corresponds to what in other dialogues is often called ‘truth’, which is said to be accessible by means of dialectic. Cf. Rep. 6.484-6, 500-1, 7.532-3, Phileb. 58b-d.

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  4. As 59cd has been misinterpreted. Plato meant that the study of natural science provides a restful interlude to the intense discipline of dialectical thought.

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  5. Cf. 29cd, 44cd, 48d, 52bc, 56ab, 59cd, 68cd.

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  7. 51d: διὰ βραχέων; 52d: ἐν χεφαλαίῳ.

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  8. 51c: πάρεργον ἄλλο μη̃χος.

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  32. Which of course is the goal of even human souls according to Aristotle himself (Nic. Eth. 1178b22-3; cf. Meta. 12.1072b25-9, 1075a5-11). The argument therefore has a point when applied to common experience, but is singularly inappropriate when compared with the ideal. In the latter case, soul would recurringly think the same thing, so the argument would prove the opposite of what he intended ! Circular motion would be regarded as aptly descriptive.

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  33. However, this criticism is made on the basis of Aristotle’s personal philosophy.

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  39. The four causes are delineated in Phys. 194b23-195a3, 198a16-22; Meta. 1.983a 26-32.

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© 1954 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Claghorn, G.S. (1954). Aristotle’s Criticism of Soul. In: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s ‘Timaeus’. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8839-5_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8839-5_7

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