Abstract
We have now stated a system of analyses which satisfies our original definition of solipsism: it interprets the statements of common sense in such a way that one can assent to them without ever talking about anything except one’s own mental states. Further, it is logically solipsistic in that it reduces assertions of logical necessity to statements about one’s own imaginative capabilities, and says that this is all we ever meant in the first place. It would be hard to imagine a more extreme thesis and, even though it does not involve doubting the existence of the world, or living in a tub, it is a legitimate heir to the title of solipsism. Further, this system is hopefully free of any contradiction or circularity of analysis. It is at least as economical as its competitors even though there are some assumptions which must be granted.
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© 1968 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Todd, W. (1968). Conclusion. In: Analytical Solipsism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8829-6_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8829-6_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-8183-9
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