Abstract
Among other things, philosophy is an activity of making and applying distinctions. Philosophical discourse develops as its contours are shaped by distinctions, where these contours become more explicit through time as the historical perspective tends to accentuate them. Often a proposed or entertained distinction takes the general logical form of being dualistic, exclusive, and exhaustive of a particular universe of discourse. Usually the hardening of a distinction in these three respects is unwarranted, and I hope to show that the current distinction between logic and psychology is unwarrantedly hardened. But before expressly considering this modern distinction, it will be instructive to look at an historical example of an unwarranted dualistic, exclusive, and exhaustive distinction — that between mind and body.
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© 1964 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Lee, D.S. (1964). The Pernicious Distinction between Logic and Psychology. In: Studies in Philosophical Psychology. Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8104-4_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8104-4_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-247-0287-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-8104-4
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