Abstract
Scholars have been concerned with the design of an optimal political structure for thousands of years, so it is hardly surprising that the question continues to be at least implicit in much of modern social science. The present work is an attempt to approach this issue from the perspective of the positivist. Thus we are initially concerned with “will,”1 not “should,” with predicting the course of political history (or development) rather than prescribing an optimal political structure. Then, based on an understanding of “will,” tentative “shoulds” are advanced. Proceeding in this order seems absolutely essential. Political structures are not static. Unlike the monuments they leave behind, they are constantly transforming themselves in response to pressures for which they themselves are partly, although indirectly, responsible. Unless one understands the underlying forces which govern political institutions, one cannot hope to reform them. Only from the vantage point of a positive theory of political structure does it make any sense to prescribe norms.
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© 1979 Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, Boston
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Auster, R.D., Silver, M. (1979). Introduction. In: The State as a Firm. Studies in Public Choice, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-7627-9_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-7627-9_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-7629-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-7627-9
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