Abstract
That the Netherlands was able to stay out of World War I was little less than a miracle, beset as it was by so many dangers and difficulties. A small country and militarily weak, it nevertheless possessed important colonial territories in both Asia and America. The livelihood of many of its people was gained from the operation of a merchant fleet which was one of the largest in the world. A large transit traffic, especially with the German industrial hinterland, was of great importance in the economic life of the country. Geographically the country was precariously situated. Its eastern and southern borders were of a character to invite aggression in case of hostilities between its neighbors. A tongue of Dutch territory jutted downward between Germany and Belgium, extending half the distance to the Luxembourg border. A narrow strip of territory south of the Scheldt gave the Netherlands control over a river which is essentially Belgian and on which is situated the great ocean port of Antwerp. In the Rhine, Holland controlled the mouth of another international river— one of the utmost importance to one of the major belligerents. Still another international river, which emptied into the seas from Dutch territory, was the Meuse. After the occupation of Belgium the Netherlands had to guard its entire land frontier against belligerent violation. Across a comparatively narrow sea lay another belligerent, England, whose fleet dominated the seas.
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De Nederlandsche Overzee Trust Maatschappij: Middelpunt van het verheer van onzijdig Nederland met het buitenland tijdens den Wereldoorlog, 1914-19, by Charlotte A. Van Maanen, I, p. 48.
Staatscourant, August 21, 1914. No. 195A.
Van Maanen, op. cit, I, p. 42.
Van Maanen, op. cit, I, p. 48.
See the case of the “Seguranca,” an American vessel, which was detained in a British port until all the consignees had agreed to receive their goods through the N.O.T., American Journal of International Law, Spec. supp. IX, pp. 343-44. The work of the N.O.T. was aided also by certain decisions of the Dutch courts. A Dutch steamer had been permitted to leave a British port for Rotterdam only after the master had taken an oath not to deliver any part of the cargo except to persons having consents from the N.O.T. A consignee demanded delivery of the goods against documents as usual, and upon refusal of the master, brought in a claim against him in the courts on the grounds that he (consignee) as a third party was in no way subject to the consequences of the voluntary acts of the master. The claim was rejected by the court. International Law Notes, I, p. 43.
Van Maanen, op. cit, I, p. 86.
See the cases of the “NoordanV Lloyd’s Cases, VIII, 337 and of the “Oranje Nassau,” Ibid, IX, 189f.
Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts in Berlin, 1918, 377.
Japikse, op. cit, p. 91; Van Maanen, op. cit, passim. Miss Van Maanen writes that “in 1916 its power in some respects exceeded that of the Government. The Government was caught in a vice. The Netherlands Government perceived that the fate of the Netherlands in a large measure began to Me in the hands of a company which had grown stronger than itself, which it could no longer persuade or drive, which had acquired control over its health, over the regular economic breathing without which no government could peacefully fulfill its task. For did not history indicate that dissatisfaction, obstruction, disorder against the government, with revolution as the result, were the time-table companions of scarcities, cessation in commerce and industry, poverty and hunger?” Op. cit, III, p. 459.
Letter of an American official at The Hague, dated August 5, 1918, quoted by Parmalee, M. Blockade and sea power, pp. 151-52.
Once on August 16, 1916 and again on October 17, 1917. Van Maanen, op. cit, III pp. 77-8 and IV, p. 162. Belligerent Governments maintained official contact with the N.O.T. through commercial attachés. The German Government appointed a commercial attaché for this purpose as early as December 15, 1914; the British Government on December 26.
Parmalee, op. cit, pp. 151-2.
How the N.O.T. was regarded by traders in other neutral countries doing business with Holland can be gathered from the following extract from Lansing’s note to Page, October 21, 1915: “Arrangements have been made to create in these neutral countries special consignees, or consignment corporations, with power to refuse shipments and to determine when the state of the country’s resources requires the importation of new commodities. American commercial interests are hampered by the intricacies of these arrangements, and many American citizens justly complain that their bona fide trade with neutral countries is greatly reduced as a consequence, while others assert that their trade, which amounted annually to a large sum, has been entirely interrupted.” American Journal of International Law, Sp. Supp. X. p. 79.
Parmalee, op. cit, pp. 146-51. Dutch Orange Book, 1919-20, pp. 23-6.
See report of American Consul at Amsterdam to the Secretary of State, October 16, 1917. Foreign relations of the United States, 1917, Supplement 2, II, pp. 1147-50.
New York Times, October 21, 1917.
The Dutch ships were not to be used in danger zones. As much as 150,000 tons might be employed for Belgian relief or for transportation to Switzerland. However, for each ship sent to the Netherlands for Belgian relief, another Dutch ship would have to leave Holland for the United States. It was this last stipulation which the Dutch found it difficult or impracticable to carry out.
For the most recent examination of the whole episode see Chapter X, “The Negotiations with Holland,” in The Policy of the United States towards the neutrals, 1917-1918 by Thomas A. Bailey. For a discussion of the requisitioning of the Dutch ships from the point of view of international law see the present writer’s Neutrality of the Netherlands during the World War For the American diplomatic documents see Foreign relations of the United States, 1917, Supp. 2, II, pp. 1117-58, 1918, Supp. 1, II. The Dutch case is presented in three reports of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the States-General on March 11, March 30 and June 21, 1918. AU three reports were sepaately printed as White Books.
Statement made on the twenty-second of March. Quoted by Van Maanen, op. cit, IV, p. 248.
De Leeuw, op. cit, devotes a whole chapter to the Von Schlieffen plan. As support for his chapter he cites the following: Helmuth von Moltke, Erinnerungen Briefe Dokumente 1877-1916, 1922; J. J. G. van Voorst tot Voorst, Over Roermond, 1923; J.V. Bredt, Die Belgische neutralität und der Schlieffensche feldzugplan, 1929; Bernhard Furst von Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, 1930. De Leeuw argues that Kuyper’s pro-German views and diplomatic maneuvers were responsible for von Schlieffen’s plans, on evidence which to the writer seems very inadequate.
Netherlands minister to Sir Edward Grey, British documents on the origin of the war, XI, p. 315.
Ibid, XI, p. 269.
Ibid, XI, pp. 308, 309. The traditional British attitude toward Holland and Belgium quickly asserted itself. In his speech to the House of Commons on August 3, Sir Edward Grey declared, “If it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may be at stake.” Parliamentary debates, Fifth Series, LXV, House of Commons, eighth volume of session of 1914, Col. 1822.
British documents on the origin of the war, XI, p. 314.
Ibid, XI, p. 326.
Ibid, XI, p. 339.
De Leeuw, op. cit, pp. 143ff. De Leeuw bases his account on the book of General Galet, during the World War Chief of the Belgian General Staff. The title of General Galet’s book is S. M. le Roi Albert Commandant en chef devant l’invasion allemande
The Netherlands was, in fact, poorly prepared. All in all, the army after mobilization counted only about 200,000 and it was inadequately supplied with ammunition. Dutch officials naturally said nothing to correct the overdrawn figures in the foreign press and the Second Chamber. Bosboom, N. In moeilijke omstandigheden, Augustus, 1914-Mei, 1917, p. 28.
British documents on the origin of the war, XI, p. 317
Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, did propose on September 7, 1914, that the British rush an expedition to the support of Antwerp by steaming up the Scheldt, in defiance of the Dutch if necessary. Churchill seems to have believed that the Dutch would have yielded to a demand from Great Britain for the transit of the Scheldt and that Germany would not have gone to war with Holland over it. He believed that “a neutral Holland was of far more use to Germany than a hostile, a conquered, or even an allied Holland.” Most military experts at the time did not think so. Grey and Kitchener were opposed to the plan. Churchill, Winston, The World crisis, 1911-1914, pp. 332-335. See Chapter XVI, “Relations with Belgium.”
Bosboom, N., op. cit, pp. 264-69.
Foreign relations of the United States, 1917, Supp. 1, p. 108
Colenbrander, H. T., Nederland in oorlogstijd, p. 123.
For a more detailed account and technical analysis of this controversy see the see the present writer’s Neutrality of the Netherlands during the World War, pp. 15-21.
Op. cit, IV, pp. 88-90.
Van Maanen, op. cit, IV, pp. 282-88.
While there is nothing about these events at The Hague in the documents printed in Foreign Relations of the United States 1918, which contains a section on the episode (Supp. 1, II, 1797-1805), they fit in very well with the course of events there sketched. There is no reason for doubting the authenticity of Miss van Maanen’s account and every reason for regarding her work as thoroughly reliable.
The diplomatic correspondence with respect to the convoy is found in the Dutch White Book, Diplomatieke bescheiden betreffende de uitzending van een convooi naar Nederlandsch-Indië Also in British state papers, 1917-1918, III, p. 533.
British documents on the origins of the war, XI, p. 312.
Interview published in Het Volk, October 27, 1914.
Op.cit, IV, p. 17.
Aanhangsel, Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, 1918-19, p. 111. Oudendijk, William J., Ways and by-ways in diplomacy, p. 321.
See “Onze beseherming van de belangen van oorlogvoerende mogendheden in het buitenland,” by Th. Heyligers in Nederlandsch administratief recht edited by J. Oppenheim, pp. 26-29.
See the statement of approval and praise by the Socialist van Kol in the First Chamber on April 25, 1918. Handelingen, Eerste Kamer, 1917-1918, pp. 474-75.
Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, 1917-18, pp. 873, 875, 876, 929, Aanhangsel, 3; 1916-17, pp. 1212-17.
Ibid, 1916-17, p. 1237, Aanhangsel, p. 65; 1917-18, p. 1239.
Handelingen, Eerste Kamer, 1915-16, p. 253 (Feb. 26, 1916).
Bosboom, op. cit, pp. 215-16.
Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, 1917-18, pp. 1903-07.
See Van Maanen, op. cit, IV, pp. 333-34.
Ibid., loc. cit.
The Netherlands-American Foundation was organized in 1921. A similar organization was set up in Amsterdam the same year. Edward Bok, the Dutch-American publisher was a prime mover in the organization of the Foundation.
Van Maanen, op. cit, VI, pp. 167-71.
See Rullman, J. C., Dr. H. Colijn, Een levensschets
Op. cit., IV, p. 210.
Handelingen, Eerste Kamer, 1918-19, Aanhangsel, pp. 13,17.
A Dutch diplomatic historian states bluntly: “Queen Wilhelmina had offered Emperor William hospitality.” Smit, C. op. cit, p. 333, footnote 1.
Handelingen, Eerste Kamer, 1918-19, Aanhangsel, pp. 13, 17. The incident takes on meaning when it is pointed out that General van Heutsz advocated an active naval and foreign policy, and the promotion of that policy by an alliance with Germany. De Leeuw, Socialist member of parliament and a specialist in Dutch foreign policy, saw in van Heutsz’s views the seeds of Dutch fascism.
Treaty of Versailles, Part 7, Article 227, Naval War College, International law documents, Treaty of Peace with Germany, 1919, p. 90.
For the diplomatic correspondence see Dutch Orange Book, Mededeelingen van den Minister van Buitenlandsche Zaken aan de Staten-Generaal Juni, 1919-April, 1920.
The American members were Secretary of State Lansing and Dr. James Brown Scot. They took the position that, according to the rules of international law, the head of a state is responsible for his acts only to his own people, that he is immune from trial in a foreign court, and that his acts are to be deemed acts of state, and as such, impressed with essentially political character. See “Report of the Commission of Responsibilities,” in American Journal of International Law, XIV, pp. 127ff. See also House and Seymour, What really happened in Paris, particularly the chapter, “The Trial of the Kaiser” and Lansing’s address in defence of his position, reprinted in American Bar Association Reports, XXXXIV, pp. 255ff. It is interesting to speculate on how Lansing and Scott would have reacted to Allied policy in this regard after World War II.
M. Benoist, French Minister at The Hague to American Chargé d’affaires Gunther. Foreign relations of the United States, 1919, II, p. 658.
The World Crisis: The Aftermath, p. 159.
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© 1959 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Vandenbosch, A. (1959). Precarious Neutrality in World War I. In: Dutch Foreign Policy Since 1815. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-6809-0_9
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