Abstract
Gerd Buchdahl’s main point has become somewhat dearer to me after long discussions with its author, with Ernest Gellner, and with J. W. N. Watkins. I have ultimately assumed that Buchdahl’s thesis is that epistemological discussion is entirely useless for scientific research, a thesis very much in tune with the philosophy now in vogue. I shall try to criticise this thesis of Buchdahl’s, and to argue that in the historical case which he chose to discuss as an illustration of his point — Dumas’s views of atomism — epistemological criticism might have been of great use as a tool for solving scientific problems. The point of view from which my criticism is launched is that of Popper, as I shall explain in the body of my discussion.
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. . .that duty to science, which consists in the enunciation of problems to be solved. . . .
Faraday
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© 1981 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Agassi, J. (1981). Epistemology as an Aid to Science. In: Science and Society. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 65. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-6456-6_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-6456-6_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-6458-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-6456-6
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