Abstract
Today the expression “scientific realism” often designates epistemological conceptions which are quite different from each other; among these the following two are especially noteworthy:
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(a)
science attempts to describe a “reality” which exists independently of it and according to which it is committed to measuring itself;
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(b)
what science states and describes is an adequate image of this reality. To admit the first conception is clearly less demanding than to admit the second: for we set ourselves the task of defending them both.
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Notes
I take the liberty of referring, for a more detailed discussion of these theses, to two works of mine: E. Agazzi, ‘The Concept of Empirical Data. Proposals for an Intensional Semantics of Empirical Theories’, in M. Przelecki et al. (eds.) Formal Methods in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1976), pp. 143–157; and also Commensurability, Incommensurability and Cumulativity in Scientific Knowledge, Erkenntnis 22 (1985), pp. 51–77.
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Agazzi, E. (1997). Naive Realism and Naive Antirealism. In: Ginev, D., Cohen, R.S. (eds) Issues and Images in the Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 192. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5788-9_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5788-9_2
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