Abstract
This paper outlines a preliminary radical plan for a constitution based primarily on recent contributions on mechanisms for choice of public goods and on constitutional rules and concepts, but based also on experience with present constitutions, corporate charters, and private arbitration procedures. It uses the standard economic perspective, disregarding such motives as herd instincts and the desire to serve the public interest. The result is markedly different from existing constitutions.
In this world of sin and woe, no one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time. Winston Churchill
The author is indebted to Peter Aranson, Paul Rubin, to students and other colleagues in the Emory University Economics Workshop, and to students and colleagues in the Clemson University Economics Seminar for helpful comments. Inasmuch as most disagree with what I propose, the usual disclaimer has more than the usual force. For the Churchill quotation, see Hansard, 11 Nov. 1947, col. 206–207.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Anderson, T.L. and Hill, P.J. (1986). Constraining the transfer society: Constitutional and moral dimensions. Cato Journal 6(Spring/Summer): 317–339.
Bailey, M.J. (1995a). Implementation of the Thompson mechanism. Public Choice forthcoming.
Bailey, M.J. (1995b). A Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for non-separable utility. Unpublished manuscript.
Bailey, M.J. (1995c). Lindahl taxes and demand revelation: How to apply the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Unpublished manuscript.
Bailey, M.J. and Rubin, P.H. (1994). A positive theory of legal change. International Review of Law and Economics 14: 467–477.
Berman, H.J. (1983). Law and revolution: The formation of western legal tradition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Brueckner, J.K. (1983). Property value maximization and public sector efficiency. Journal of Urban Economics 14: 1–15.
Buchanan, J. and Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Buchanan, J. and Faith, R.L. (1987). Secession and the limits of taxation: Toward a theory of internal exit. American Economic Review 77 (December): 1023–1031.
Calfee, J.E. and Rubin, P.H. (1992). Some implications of damage payments for nonpecuniary losses. Journal of Legal Studies 21: 371–411.
Carter, A.T. (1944). An English history of the courts. 7th Ed. London: Butterworth.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers.
Green, J. and Laffont, J.-J. (1977). On the revelation of preferences for public goods. Journal of Public Economics 8: 79–93.
Groves, T., Radner, R. and Reiter, S. (1987). Information, incentives, and economic mechanisms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Hochman, H.M. and Rodgers, J.D. (1969). Pareto optimal redistribution. American Economic Review 59: 1348–1362.
Hamilton, A., Madison, J. and Jay, J. (1961). The Federalist Papers. New York: The New American Library.
Hufbauer, G.C., Berliner, D.T. and Elliott, K.A. (1986). Trade protection in the United States: 31 case studies. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Jackson, R.M. (1972). The machinery of justice in England. 6th ed. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Kiralfy, A.R. (1990). The English legal system. 2nd ed. (1956) London: Sweet & Maxwell, 8th ed. (1990).
Lowenberg, A.D. and Yu, B.T. (1992). Efficient constitution formation and maintenance: The role of exit. Constitutional Political Economy 3 (Winter): 51–72.
Marlow, M. (1992). Intergovernmental competition, voice and exit options and the design of fiscal structure. Constitutional Political Economy 3 (Winter): 73–88.
Merville, L.J. and Osborne, D.K. (1990). Constitutional democracy and the theory of agency. Constitutional Political Economy 1 (Fall): 21–47.
Mueller, D.H. (1989). Public Choice II. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Mueller, D.H. (1991). Choosing a constitution in Eastern Europe: Lessons from public choice. Journal of Comparative Economics 15 (June): 325–348.
Mueller, D.H., Tollison, R.D. and Willett, T.D. (1972). Representative democracy via random selection. Public Choice 12 (Spring): 57–68.
Ordeshook, P.C. (1992). Constitutional stability. Constitutional Political Economy 3 (Spring/Summer): 137–175.
Rubin, P.H. and Bailey, M.J. (1994). The role of lawyers in changing the law. Journal of Legal Studies 23: 807–831.
Spindler, Z.A. (1990). Constitutional design for a rent-seeking society. Constitutional Political Economy 1 (Fall): 73–82.
Starrett, D.A. (1988). Foundations of public economics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sunstein, C.R. (1991). Constitutionalism, prosperity, democracy: Transition in Eastern Europe. Constitutional Political Economy 2 (Fall): 371–394.
Thompson, E.A. (1966). A Pareto optimal group decision process. In G. Tullock (Ed.), Papers on non-market decision making. Charlottesville: University of Virginia.
Varian, H.R. (1992). Microeconomic analysis. 3rd ed. New York: Norton.
Wildasin, D.E. (1979). Local public goods, property values, and local public choice. Journal of Urban Economics 6: 521–534.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bailey, M.J. (1997). Toward a new constitution for a future country. In: Rowley, C.K. (eds) Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6416-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-5728-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive