Subsidiarity and ecologically based taxation: A European constitutional perspective

Abstract

The principle of subsidiarity through its re-affirmation in the Treaty of Maastricht became an integral and central part of European constitutional law. Its relationship to ecological issues, however, has so far not been explored. Subsidiarity is a general principle of organization. It can apply to all areas of policy: financial, agricultural, technological, education, defense, economic development and, e.g. environmental policy. The principle of subsidiarity is silent about the specific purpose, direction or content of a particular policy.

Whatever be the purpose of any such policy, the principle of subsidiarity requires that it be carried out within that context which is the smallest viable one in which the objective can successfully be attained. When a task is too complicated for a small unit such as an office or a firm to be successfully performed, that unit has to be augmanted to the point where the task can be effectively performed. Likewise, if an organization is too large to successfully handle particular problems as its procedure may be too cumbersome or as it lacks sufficient detailed information or experience repeated recurrences of problems it has tried to settle, then a different organizational form must be found, preferably an existing one, which is closer to the problem at hand and able to carry out the policy. With the shift in responsibility will also travel the access to resources with which to carry out the task.

Since ecological units rarely co-incide with political units, the principle of subsidiarity poses a specific challenge to politicians and administrators who have to decide on assignments of tasks and responsibilities as well as funding within the different echelons and among the different Member States of the European Union.

This essay explores those tasks and, in particular, advances the notion of establishing ecological tax units.