Abstract
According to the received view the identity theory was developed in the decade stretching from the mid fifties to the mid sixties. At the time the identity theory seemed like an outrageous minority view. In the face of near universal opposition the early identity theorists developed a remarkable esprit de corps—they emphasized the similarities and de-emphasized the differences of their respective views. This sort of team spirit may have seemed essential to win a philosophical battle; but it also helped to obscure the crucial differences between the various theories that sailed under the flag of the identity theory. Today I want to invert the strategy of the early identity theorist—I want to emphasize the differences and de-emphasize the similarities between the early versions of the identity theory.
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Stubenberg, L. (1997). Austria vs. Australia: Two Versions of the Identity Theory. In: Lehrer, K., Marek, J.C. (eds) Austrian Philosophy Past and Present. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 190. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5720-9_9
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