Abstract
Haller claims that Brentano is an empiricist Brentano is close to Comte’s positivism and to the Vienna circle in emphasizing the methods of natural science as appropriate for philosophy. He also underscores the importance of experience as a starting point of analysis. All this seems convincing.
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References
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Potrc, M. (1997). Haller and Brentano’s Empiricism. In: Lehrer, K., Marek, J.C. (eds) Austrian Philosophy Past and Present. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 190. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5720-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5720-9_5
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