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The Structure of Radical Probabilism

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Abstract

Does the philosophy of Radical Probabilism have enough structure to enable it to address fundamental epistemological questions? The requirement of dynamic coherence provides the structure for radical probabilist epistemology. This structure is sufficient to establish (i) the value of knowledge and (ii) long run convergence of degrees of belief.

This paper was read at the Luino conference on Probability, Dynamics and Causality June, 1995. The discussion of convergence is largely drawn from Skyrms (forthcoming). I would like to thank Dick Jeffrey, Persi Diaconis and Sandy Zabell for helpful comments.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, 400-HOB, Irvine, CA, 92717-4555, USA

    Brian Skyrms

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  1. Brian Skyrms
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Genova, Italy

    Domenico Costantini

  2. University of Trieste, Italy

    Maria Carla Galavotti

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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Skyrms, B. (1997). The Structure of Radical Probabilism. In: Costantini, D., Galavotti, M.C. (eds) Probability, Dynamics and Causality. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5712-4_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5712-4_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6409-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-5712-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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