Abstract
We analyze common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic and extensive form of a game. We define a notion of sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form, and show that, in finite extensive games with perfect recall, the strategies that are consistent with common reasoning about sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form are exactly those that are consistent with common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic form representation of the game. Thus in such games the solution given by common reasoning about admissibility does not depend on how the strategic situation is represented. We further explore the links between iterated admissibility and backward and forward induction.
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Bicchieri, C., Schulte, O. (1997). Common Reasoning about Admissibility. In: Costantini, D., Galavotti, M.C. (eds) Probability, Dynamics and Causality. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5712-4_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5712-4_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6409-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-5712-4
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