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Theories of Contextualists and Neo-Formalists

  • Chapter
The Richness of Contract Law

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 28))

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Abstract

This chapter begins the discussion of the role of judicial discretion in applying contract law. I focus here on the normative debate over the relative merits of standards and rules in contract law.1 I leave for the next chapter the claim that contract law as a whole contains a “fundamental contradiction”2 that enables judges to decide cases-at their discretion.

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  112. Judge Scalia is now Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court.

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  114. 727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984). at 1154. The reasoning is similar when the issue is a bank’s right to set NSF fees: “[Discretion had to be exercised within the confines of the reasonable expectations of the depositors.” Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554, 558 (Or. 1987).

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  129. Market St. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d (7th. Cir. 1991).

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  130. Market St. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d at 591. The lessee wrote to the lessor-finance company “to ask again that you advise us immediately if you are willing to provide the financing pursuant to the lease.” Id.

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  131. Market St. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d at 591. The lessee wrote to the lessor-finance company “to ask again that you advise us immediately if you are willing to provide the financing pursuant to the lease.”

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  133. In the actual case, the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the lessor. Judge Posner, for the court, remanded for a determination of the facts. In dicta, he suggested that, if the facts were as set forth here, he would fmd bad faith. at 595-596.

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  134. In the actual case, the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the lessor. Judge Posner, for the court, remanded for a determination of the facts. In dicta, he suggested that, if the facts were as set forth here, he would fmd bad faith. at 596.

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  135. In the actual case, the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the lessor. Judge Posner, for the court, remanded for a determination of the facts. In dicta, he suggested that, if the facts were as set forth here, he would fmd bad faith.

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  136. In the actual case, the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the lessor. Judge Posner, for the court, remanded for a determination of the facts. In dicta, he suggested that, if the facts were as set forth here, he would fmd bad faith. at 595.

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  138. In the actual case, the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the lessor. Judge Posner, for the court, remanded for a determination of the facts. In dicta, he suggested that, if the facts were as set forth here, he would fmd bad faith. at 597.

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  211. Theorists published much of their work on unconscionability and good faith in the 1960s and 1970s, about the time when states considered and adopted the Uniform Commeercial Code, which, we have seen, includes both standards.

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  1. Cornell Law School, New York, USA

    Robert A. Hillman (Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law)

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Hillman, R.A. (1997). Theories of Contextualists and Neo-Formalists. In: The Richness of Contract Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5680-6_5

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