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The Richness of Contract Law pp 43–77Cite as

Theories of Promissory Estoppel: Reliance and Promise

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Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 28))

Abstract

Despite contract law’s modern-day theoretical pluralism, discussed in Chapter 1, the bargain theory of consideration constituted the principal basis for enforcement of promises in the United’States from the late-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century.1 The bargain theory was underinclusive, however, in part because an assortment of gratuitous promises called out for enforcement.2 Suppose, for example, a promisee improved land in reliance on a landowner’s broken gift promise to convey. Suppose a promisee failed to insure her property in reliance on an insurance agent’s gratuitous broken promise to insure the property. Suppose a donor broke a promise to donate money to a charity.3 Responding to the promisee’s hardship or, occasionally, another strong policy such as aiding charitable institutions, courts began to enforce these and other gratuitous promises.4 Corbin amassed these cases to persuade the drafters of the first Restatement of Contracts to recognize justifiable reliance on gift promises as a distinct basis of enforcement.5

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Reference

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  162. For example, see the discussion of plant closings in Chapter 5.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cornell Law School, New York, USA

    Robert A. Hillman (Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law)

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  1. Robert A. Hillman
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Hillman, R.A. (1997). Theories of Promissory Estoppel: Reliance and Promise. In: The Richness of Contract Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5680-6_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5680-6_3

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