Abstract
Jerry Fodor’s Conservative account of mind and meaning is in some respects similar to the Classical Theory of Mind. I will show that it differs from CTM in certain features which are characteristic of Analytic Philosophy in general, and that precisely because of these features the account fails. Much of this chapter will be given to expository groundwork and a variety of minor arguments; Chapter 6 will contain the crucial case against Fodor.
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Novak, P. (1997). Conservative Rationalism I. In: Mental Symbols. Studies in Cognitive Systems, vol 19. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5632-5_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5632-5_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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