Abstract
The notion that it could be wrong to have a child seems strange to us, for it challenges many of our basic beliefs about the significance of procreation. Children are gifts of God whom we count as a blessing. As we gain greater control over our powers of reproduction and learn more than ever before about children whom we could bring into the world, however, the question of whether we ought to “produce a man” pushes its way to the fore. By isolating our genes and detecting their connections with certain diseases, we can predict with varying degrees of certainty whether our offspring will be affected by specific genetic conditions. And by merging sperm and egg in a glass dish, we can examine the resulting preembryo before implantation and learn whether it bears a deleterious condition of concern. Thus, prospective parents today face agonizing decisions about whether to conceive children or whether to avoid conception for the sake of children whom they will never know. They are caught in a conflict between the desire and call to have a child and the troubling thought that they might give a life to a child that could be viewed as “wrongful.” The notion that it could be wrong to have a child startles us and creates difficult new ethical and theological questions.
Now the man knew his wife Eve, and she conceived and bore Cain, saying, “I have produced a man with the help of the Lord” (Genesis 4:1).
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Brock, D.: 1995, ‘The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms—the Case of Wrongful Handicaps’, Bioethics 9, 269–275.
Chadwick, R. F.: 1982, ‘Cloning,’ Philosophy 57, 201–209.
Cohen, C. B.: 1996, ‘“Give Me Children or I Shall Die!” New Reproductive Technologies and Harm to Children,’ Hastings Center Report 26(2), 19–27.
Feinberg, J.: 1988, “Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming,” Social Philosophy and Policy 4, 145–178.
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A. 2d 689 (1967).
Hare, R. M: 1993, ‘When Does Potentiality Count?’, in Essays on Bioethics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 84–97.
Hare, R. M: 1993, ‘Possible People’, in Essays on Bioethics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 67–83.
Heyd, D.: 1992, Genethics, University of California Press, Berkeley, pp. 29–33.
Kamm, F. M.: 1993, Morality, Mortality, Volume I. Death and Whom to Save from It, Oxford University Press, New York.
Macklin, R.: 1994, ‘Splitting Embryos on the Slippery Slope’, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 4, 209–225.
Nagel, T.: 1979, ‘Death’, in Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1–10.
Parfit, D.: 1985, Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Post, S. G.: 1993, ‘Designer Babes, Selective Abortion, and Human Perfection’, in Inquiries in Bioethics, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., pp. 7–21.
Powers, M.: 1996, ‘The Moral Right to Have Children’, in R. Faden and N. Kass (eds.), HIV, AIDS, and Childbearing: Public Policy, Private Lives, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 320–344.
Robertson, J. A.: 1983, ‘Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth’, University of Virginia Law Review 69, 434.
Robertson, J. A.: 1986, ‘Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction’, Southern California Law Review 59, 958, 988.
Robertson, J. A.: 1994, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.
Rothman, B. K.: 1986, The Tentative Pregnancy: Prenatal Diagnosis and the Future of Motherhood, Penguin Books, New York.
Bouma, H. III, Diekema, D., Langerak, E., Rottman, T., Verhey, A.: 1989, Christian Faith, Health, and Medical Practice, William B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cohen, C.B. (1997). The Morality of Knowingly Conceiving Children with Serious Conditions: An Expanded “Wrongful Life” Standard. In: Fotion, N., Heller, J.C. (eds) Contingent Future Persons. Theology and Medicine, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5566-3_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5566-3_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6345-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-5566-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive