Abstract
According to a non-realist conception, the notion of truth is epistemically constrained: the anti-realist accepts one version or another of the Knowability Principle (‘Any true proposition is knowable’). There is, however, a well-known argument, first published by Frederic Fitch (1963), which seems to threaten the anti-realist position. Starting out from seemingly innocuous assumptions, Fitch claims to prove: if there is some true proposition which nobody knows to be true, then there is a true proposition which nobody can know to be true.
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Lindstrom, S. (1997). Situations, Truth and Knowability: A Situation-Theoretic Analysis of A Paradox By Fitch. In: Ejerhed, E., Lindström, S. (eds) Logic, Action and Cognition. Trends in Logic, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5524-3_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5524-3_9
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