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Logic, Action and Cognition pp 149–179Cite as

Drawing Inferences from Conditionals

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Part of the book series: Trends in Logic ((TREN,volume 2))

Abstract

This paper compares three accounts of what can be inferred from a knowledge base that contains conditionals: Lehmann and Magidor’s Rational Entailment; Pearl’s System Z, later extended and refined in collaboration with Goldszmidt; and the present author’s Nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision. We show that although the ideas motivating these systems are strikingly different, they are formally equivalent. An explanation of the surprising parallel is offered in terms of the interpretation of conditionals in the context of nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision. Finally, some common problems with the equivalent systems are outlined, as well as some problems in assessing these problems which indicate that a general definition of dependence between the items in a knowledge base is needed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Hans Rott

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  1. Hans Rott
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Linguistics, Umeå University, Sweden

    Eva Ejerhed

  2. Department of Philosophy, Umeå University, Sweden

    Sten Lindström

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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Rott, H. (1997). Drawing Inferences from Conditionals. In: Ejerhed, E., Lindström, S. (eds) Logic, Action and Cognition. Trends in Logic, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5524-3_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5524-3_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6326-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-5524-3

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