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All Other Things Being Equal: On a Notion of Inertia in Conditional Logic

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Logic, Action and Cognition

Part of the book series: Trends in Logic ((TREN,volume 2))

Abstract

In this paper we study the so-called Possible Models Approach, which is a particular semantics for belief change where no meta-linguistic information such as preference or entrenchment is involved. Via the Ramsey Test we represent the change operation in the language by a conditional operator. Ther particular minimal change notion is essentially expressed by the persistence axiom

$$C \to . A > C{\rm{ if}} A {\rm{and}} C {\rm{do not interfere,}}$$

where two formulas A and C interfere if they have some atom in common. We give a axiomatization of the Possible Models Approach. The completeness proof is based on a strong normal form theorem.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IRIT, Université Paul Sabatier, Toulouse, France

    Luis Fariñas del Cerro & Andreas Herzig

Authors
  1. Luis Fariñas del Cerro
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  2. Andreas Herzig
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Linguistics, Umeå University, Sweden

    Eva Ejerhed

  2. Department of Philosophy, Umeå University, Sweden

    Sten Lindström

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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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del Cerro, L.F., Herzig, A. (1997). All Other Things Being Equal: On a Notion of Inertia in Conditional Logic. In: Ejerhed, E., Lindström, S. (eds) Logic, Action and Cognition. Trends in Logic, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5524-3_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5524-3_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6326-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-5524-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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