Abstract
Whereas we have spoken so far (especially in chapter I) quite plainly of the world of our experiences as of the ‘real’ world, we must now say something about a manner of speaking that uses ‘real’ and ‘experience’ as designating a pair of opposites. The difference between the terms ‘real’ and ‘apparent’ plays a great role in ordinary life as well as in natural science. For example we say: ‘apparently’ the detective took a quiet walk, but ‘really’ he carefully watched the entrance to a jeweller’s shop. Or: The stone on which I stepped was ‘apparently’ quite fast, but it was ‘really’ so loose that it broke off.
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Frank, P., Cohen, R.S. (1998). On the So-Called ‘True’ World. In: Cohen, R.S. (eds) The Law of Causality and Its Limits. Vienna Circle Collection, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5516-8_10
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