Abstract
In the last three chapters we looked at programs that involve the largest “lwelfare” expenditures in most modern states. One of them, medicine, is not yet fully a government-supported activity in the United States, but in most other countries it is. In all these cases there is, of course, a component of aid to the poor, but it seems likely that the poor would be better off if the programs had not been started and the pre-Bismarckian system of income-tested aid to the poor was relied on. In this chapter we deal with another aspect of the transfer society, more specifically what is now called rent-seeking.173
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References
James M. Buchanan, Robert Tollison, and Gordon Tullock (eds.) A Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College Station, TX: Texas A & M Press, 1981).
New York Times, December 8, 1995, p. 1.
Joon H. Suh, “‘Voluntary’ Export Restraints and Their Effects on Exporters and Consumers: The Case of Footwear Quotas,” Working Paper Number 71, Washington University, (St. Louis). This recent paper measures the welfare effect of a voluntary export restraint on the import of shoes and their antipoor effect.
This, however, was restricted pretty much to competition by frequency of service. The CAB regulated such things as the kind of seat that could be installed, the kind of food that could be served, and the amount of alcoholic beverage that could be served. The only thing it did not regulate was frequency of service. The result of this, of course, was much more frequent service than was economically desirable at those prices.
I am a bachelor in the upper-income brackets, and almost all my aircraft transportation flights are connected with business.
It should not be terribly difficult to calculate, but the job calls for someone who knows more about agriculture than I.
The food would, of course, have had to be paid for. A good deal of the food, in fact, was given away under various programs designed to reduce the size of the embarrassing stockpiles of food in the United States.
I once heard Milton Freidman use it as an example of how businessmen who are in favor of free competition tend to look for government regulations to protect themselves, but this is the only public criticism I ever heard.
This is not quite true due to the fact that the “employers’ contribution” is not included in the employee’s income for income tax purposes. This would lower that portion’s cost to the employee slightly.
This proves they are obscurantists.
Who are broken into a number of subcategories.
For some further work along these lines, see Gordon Tullock, “The Economics of the Media,” Center for the Study of Public Choice, Working Paper No. CE-78-1-15.
This may well be true, and it may also be false.
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Tullock, G. (1997). Administrative Transfers. In: Economics of Income Redistribution. Studies in Public Choice, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5378-2_11
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