Abstract
This chapter considers the case for Independent Central Banks (hereafter ICBs), which is rejected on the grounds that it would worsen the performance of the real economy in terms of levels of the rate of growth of aggregate output and employment. The recent debate on ICBs has tended to associate such an institution with the sole objective of price stability (or low inflation). However, that association is not a necessity and indeed central banks which are seen as having a considerable degree of independence (e.g., the US Federal Reserve) have been given a range of objectives including high levels of employment.
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Arestis, P., Sawyer, M. (1997). The Problematic Nature of Independent Central Banks. In: Cohen, A.J., Hagemann, H., Smithin, J. (eds) Money, Financial Institutions and Macroeconomics. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 53. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5362-1_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5362-1_15
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