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The European Central Bank

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The Path to European Economic and Monetary Union

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Abstract

The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is not yet a reality but the process of economic and monetary integration has already had an impact on the global financial markets and the international monetary system. Hence, it is important to understand the nature of the EMU and of the institutions that will coordinate and administer its activities. Yet, while most member nations support the idea of a single currency and of common monetary policies, there are serious problems with the technical aspects of the transition process, the convergence criteria, and the design of the EMU institutions as well as the EMU’s membership.

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Notes

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  1. The George Washington University, USA

    Scheherazade S. Rehman

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  1. Scheherazade S. Rehman
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Rehman, S.S. (1997). The European Central Bank. In: The Path to European Economic and Monetary Union. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5358-4_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5358-4_5

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