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The Possibilities and Limitations of Biological Weapons Conversion

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Conversion of Former BTW Facilities

Part of the book series: NATO Science Series ((ASDT,volume 21))

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Abstract

In the United States, the two facilities for biological weapons research and production were converted between 1969 and 1972. Between the time that the Biological and Toxins Weapon Convention (BTWC) was signed and came into force-1972 to 1975--and the present time, some six to ten countries have initiated or maintained national BW R&D programs with various degrees of offensive character. None of these, however, appear to be discontinuing their programs at the present time of their own volition or under the pressure of international attention to their divergence from the BTWC. There is, therefore, no current attention being paid to questions dealing with the facilitation of conversion in these other states, Iran or Iraq for example. For the past half dozen years or a bit more, the overwhelming practical issue in the area of the conversion of former BW R&D facilities has been the BW R&D institutes of the former USSR. The examination of BW R&D conversion in this paper will therefore be built almost entirely around this particular current and continuing problem. It is also written entirely from the viewpoint of arms control; that is, economic or marketing issues are not its primary concerns, although these are among the most obvious “limitations” which will be discussed.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland College Park, 20742-1811, MD, USA

    Milton Leitenberg

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  1. Milton Leitenberg
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Max-Delbrück-Center for Molecular Medicine, Berlin-Buch, Germany

    Erhard Geissler  & Ernst Buder  & 

  2. National Research Institute for Radiobiology and Radiohygiene, Budapest, Hungary

    Lajos Gazsó

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Leitenberg, M. (1998). The Possibilities and Limitations of Biological Weapons Conversion. In: Geissler, E., Gazsó, L., Buder, E. (eds) Conversion of Former BTW Facilities. NATO Science Series, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5306-5_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5306-5_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-5250-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-5306-5

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