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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 271))

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Abstract

The concept of distributive justice is here considered in an extremely simplified form, viz. relative to the situation when n objects are to be divided among m persons (1 ≤ nm ≥ 2) and no account is taken of factors that could differentiate the persons as far as this division is concerned, such as their merits or needs. By so limiting the concept of justice, we gain the possibility of a formal analysis. On the other hand, the applicability of such a concept in actual social contexts is rather probabilistic.

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Notes

  1. K. Szaniawski, ‘O pojęciu podziału dóbr’ (’On the Concept of Distribution of Goods’), Studia Filozoficzne 2 (1966). The main result is described in K. Szaniawski, ‘Formal Analysis of Evaluative Concepts’, International Social Science Journal 27 (1975). [see this volume, pp. 128–139.]

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  2. The postulate has formerly been expressed in a more general way, viz. that no one gets k + 2 (or more) objects while someone else gets k objects. Coupled with the assumption that there can be more objects than persons, this had counterintuitive consequences. Preference ordering of the set G does not uniquely determine preference ordering of the set 2G. Thus we can have it that both person 1 and 2 strongly prefer A to B, C, D. Then, under the natural assumption of monotonicity: XYX < Y (X and Y ranging over 2G), the division d 1 attributing A to 1 and B, C, D to 2 is more egalitarian than the division d 2 attributing A, B to 1 and C, D to 2. But d 1 is prohibited by the above postulate, while d 2 is not. One way to block this undesirable consequence is to introduce the restriction: n ≤ m. The danger in unrestricted use of R was pointed out to me by Mogens Blegvad. I want to thank Professor Blegvad for his valuable criticism.

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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Szaniawski, K. (1998). On Formal Aspects of Distributive Justice. In: Chmielewski, A., Woleński, J. (eds) On Science, Inference, Information and Decision-Making. Synthese Library, vol 271. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5260-0_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5260-0_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6213-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-5260-0

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