Moral Categoriality & Moral Being

  • H. Peter Steeves
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 143)


For the moment, we shift gears. Having investigated the constitution of the Ego and the Other, we eventually want to turn to the ethical implications of such a social ontology. I begin, though, with an inquiry into the nature of moral action and the degree to which being moral is a necessary human way of being as opposed to a voluntary choice made in certain situations.


Public Good Relational Theory Human Relation Nicomachean Ethic Moral Thinking 
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  1. 1.
    Sokolowski argues these points in Moral Action (1985) and three shorter, yet in many ways more insightful essays, “Moral Thinking,” “What is Moral Action?,” and “Knowing Natural Law” which have been compiled in his Pictures, Quotations, and Distinctions (1992).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Cf. Sokolowski (1992), 246–48.Google Scholar
  3. 4.
    Sokolowski (1992), 249.Google Scholar
  4. 5.
    Sokolowski (1992), 266. Hart suggests something similar when he proposes that objects are “suffused” with syntax. (Cf. Hart (1992), 304.)Google Scholar
  5. 6.
    Cf. Sokolowski (1985), 41–48.Google Scholar
  6. 7.
    Sokolowski (1985), 45 and (1992) 266.Google Scholar
  7. 8.
    See Sokolowski (1985), 46–75 for the uniqueness and superordination of moral acts.Google Scholar
  8. 9.
    Sokolowski (1985), 48, 49, 53.Google Scholar
  9. l0.
    Hart (1992), 306.Google Scholar
  10. 11.
    Sokolowski (1992), 256.Google Scholar
  11. 13.
    Sokolowski (1992), 250.Google Scholar
  12. 14.
    Sokolowski (1985), 157.Google Scholar
  13. l5.
    Hart (1992), 304–5.Google Scholar
  14. 16.
    Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a2.Google Scholar
  15. 17.
    Sokolowski (1985), 157.Google Scholar
  16. 19.
    Hart (1992), 306.Google Scholar
  17. 20.
    Hart (1990), 133. For more on this consult this article as well as Hart (1992), chapter III, §17–19.Google Scholar
  18. 21.
    Hart (1990), 134–35.Google Scholar
  19. 23.
    Sokolowski(1985),71.Google Scholar
  20. 27.
    Husserl(1960), 111.Google Scholar
  21. 28.
    Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, Chapter 5 for all of this. Of course the later Heidegger claims that a moral mode of being such as we suggest cannot be, but that is a debate for another day.Google Scholar
  22. 29.
    Sokolowski (1985), 59.Google Scholar
  23. 30.
    Hart (1992), 305.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • H. Peter Steeves
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCalifornia State UniversityFresnoUSA

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