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What Can the Semantic Properties of Innate Representations Explain?

  • Pierre Jacob
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 77)

Abstract

Some of the things I do, I do for no reason: I inhale oxygen, I vomit, I cough, I hiccup, I perspire, I snore, and so on and so forth, if and when I do, for no reason. Other things I do, I do for reasons and some of my reasons for doing them are the contents of my beliefs and desires, i.e., my propositional attitudes. So I recently went to the travel agent closest to the place where I live because I wanted to reserve my flight from Paris to Amsterdam, I believed I could do so by going to a travel agent and I wanted to go as close to my place as possible.

Keywords

Causal Explanation Semantic Property Propositional Attitude Travel Agent Mental Causation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pierre Jacob
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Cognitive ScienceCNRSLyonFrance

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