Abstract
Some of the things I do, I do for no reason: I inhale oxygen, I vomit, I cough, I hiccup, I perspire, I snore, and so on and so forth, if and when I do, for no reason. Other things I do, I do for reasons and some of my reasons for doing them are the contents of my beliefs and desires, i.e., my propositional attitudes. So I recently went to the travel agent closest to the place where I live because I wanted to reserve my flight from Paris to Amsterdam, I believed I could do so by going to a travel agent and I wanted to go as close to my place as possible.
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Jacob, P. (1998). What Can the Semantic Properties of Innate Representations Explain?. In: Bransen, J., Cuypers, S.E. (eds) Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 77. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5082-8_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5082-8_9
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