Making X Happen: Prolepsis and the Problem of Mental Determination
When I enter my office, I do a great many things without paying any attention to the details of what I do and how I do it. I turn the key to unlock the door, turn on the light if necessary, put down my briefcase on a chair, and take off my coat. All these things I do quite automatically, without explicit consciousness. This is because long ago, or so we might put it, my body took over.
KeywordsDesign Problem Internal State Normative Constraint Timely Reinforcement Explicit Consciousness
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Bratman, M.E. (1987), Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
- Dretske, F. (1988), Explaining Behaviour. Reasons in a World of Causes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Hudson, C.W. (1982), The Marxist philosophy of Ernst Bloch. London: Macmillan Press.Google Scholar
- Kahn, C.H. (1988), “Plato’s ‘Charmides’ and the Proleptic Reading of Socratic Dialogues”, in Journal of Philosophy, Vol 85., pp 541–549.Google Scholar
- Kennett, J. and Smith, M. (1994), “Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of Will”, in M. Michael and J. O’Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind. The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, pp. 141–157.Google Scholar
- Pettit, P. (1993), The Common Mind. An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Sandbach, F.H. ( 1971), “Ennoia and Prolepsis in the Stoic Theory of Knowledge”, in A.A. Long (ed.) Problems in Stoicism. London: The Athlone Press, 1971, pp. 22–37.Google Scholar