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The Real Reasons

  • Frederick Stoutland
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 77)

Abstract

I have long defended an account of action which denies the centrality of causation either for constituting agency or for explaining action. While this cuts across the grain of what has been for over thirty years the received view in the analytic tradition to which I belong, I have, with the aid and comfort of fellow travelers, persevered. I am increasingly convinced that the received view, held by philosophers as diverse as Audi and Fodor, Searle and Dretske, should be rejected.

Keywords

Action Explanation Stop Sign Propositional Attitude Representational Content Causal Claim 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frederick Stoutland
    • 1
  1. 1.St. Olaf College and University of HelsinkiUSA

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