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The Possibility of Philosophy of Action

  • Michael Smith
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 77)

Abstract

Fred moves his finger, thereby flicking the switch, turning on the light, illuminating the room and alerting the prowler (Davidson 1963). What explains the action or actions he performs?

Keywords

Humean Explanation Evaluative Belief Distinct Existence Dispositional Theory Profound Challenge 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Smith
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy Program, Research School of Social ScienceAustralian National UniversityAustralia

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