What We Do: A Nonreductive Approach to Human Action
“What is left over,” Wittgenstein once asked, “if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?”1 In this paper, I shall try to give a nonreductive and nondualistic answer to this question. First, I shall simply present a view of human action that allows a straightforward answer to Wittgenstein’s question, and then show how this view of human action fits into a general conception of what a human person or agent is. Next, I shall show how this view can handle what Jaegwon Kim has called ‘the problem of explanatory exclusion.’ Finally, I shall offer reasons why a nonreductive approach to action is needed.
KeywordsBodily Motion Basic Action Complete Explanation Mental Causation Causal Property
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