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What We Do: A Nonreductive Approach to Human Action

  • Lynne Rudder Baker
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 77)

Abstract

“What is left over,” Wittgenstein once asked, “if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?”1 In this paper, I shall try to give a nonreductive and nondualistic answer to this question. First, I shall simply present a view of human action that allows a straightforward answer to Wittgenstein’s question, and then show how this view of human action fits into a general conception of what a human person or agent is. Next, I shall show how this view can handle what Jaegwon Kim has called ‘the problem of explanatory exclusion.’ Finally, I shall offer reasons why a nonreductive approach to action is needed.

Keywords

Bodily Motion Basic Action Complete Explanation Mental Causation Causal Property 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. Baker, L.R. (1993), “Metaphysics and Mental Causation” in Mental Causation, John Heil and Alfred Mele, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 75–97.Google Scholar
  2. Baker, L.R. (1995a), Explaining Attitudes. A Practical Approach to the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lynne Rudder Baker
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Massachusetts at AmherstUSA

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