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Two Claims that can Save a Nonreductive Account of Mental Causation

  • Marc Slors
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 77)

Abstract

Right now I am acting. I am striking keys on my computer keyboard. l do so for a reason. I intend to write a paper. I believe that this intention causes me to act in the way I do. I believe, in other words, that my mental states have the causal powers to e.g. move my fingers over the keyboard and make them hit the appropriate keys.

Keywords

Causal Power Mental Causation Downward Causation Causal Efficacy Causal Relevance 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marc Slors
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Nijmegen (KUN)Netherlands

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