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Introduction

  • Jan Bransen
  • Stefaan E. Cuypers
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 77)

Abstract

Any understanding of ourselves would be impossible, if it did not start from the ordinary fact that we, as embodied thinking subjects, make things happen. Any philosophy of mind and action as well as social and political theory must take into account the simple fact that human beings causally bring about states of affairs in the world and, moreover, have reasons for doing so. Philosophical reflection inevitably must take into account this commonsensical fact that human action involves deliberation as well as causation. Philosophers who attempt to arrive at a better understanding of the way in which human action involves deliberation should do so against the background of the fact that there is also a causal story that can or has to be told about our reasons for action. And, conversely, philosophers who attempt to arrive at a better understanding of the way in which human action involves mental causation, should do so in light of the fact that there is also a deliberative story that can or has to be told about the causes of our actions.

Keywords

Causal Power Propositional Attitude Mental Causation Causal Efficacy Causal Relevance 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jan Bransen
    • 1
  • Stefaan E. Cuypers
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUtrecht UniversityNetherlands
  2. 2.Fund of Scientific Research (Flanders), Institute of PhilosophyCatholic University of LeuvenBelgium

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