Abstract
We must now consider two kinds of alleged entity which might cause trouble for the existence principle. In speaking of what exists, what we normally have in mind is particular things and events. When we say for example that everything in the time-series exists, it is such particular things and events that we have in mind. What now are we to say about the universal kinds of which these particulars are instances. And what about their properties—their intrinsic qualities and the relations between them? Can we say that these also exist? And if so, are they not plausible candidates for having some different kind of existence?
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Gibson, Q. (1998). Universals and Properties. In: The Existence Principle. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 75. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5066-8_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5066-8_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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