Abstract
In discussing appearances, we have noted different ways in which we might try to deny their existence, thereby avoiding danger of conflict with the existence principle. There were in fact three such ways—the ‘direct realist’ way, the ‘non-existent-object’ way, and the way which rejects the whole of folk psychology as false. All of these, as we saw, faced serious difficulties. In dealing with the first of them, however, we did no more than mention one idea which might on consideration enable us to reinstate it as an acceptable solution to the problem. This is the idea of a perspective.
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Gibson, Q. (1998). Perspectives and Partial Truths. In: The Existence Principle. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 75. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5066-8_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5066-8_5
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