Conflicting Apprehensions and the Question of Sensations

  • Christina Schües
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 148)


Guided by problems of misperception, perceptual doubt, change and modification in a perceptual process, I ask in this essay whether there is a sensual base which may accomodate two different, even conflicting apprehensions I might have of — so it seems — the ‘same’ object. I will start by laying out the context of the question and by explicating the question itself. Then I will investigate this question by considering Husserl’s later works, in particular Die Analysen zur passiven Synthesis in which he not only advances a genetic analysis but also opens a way to discuss concepts which lie beyond such subjective achievements as sensorial complexes, affects, associations and motivations.


Perceptual Experience Perceptual Sense Perceptual Object Intentional Object Intended Object 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Bernet, R.: “Endlichkeit und Unendlichkeit in Husserls Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung.” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 40, 1978, p. 251–269.Google Scholar
  2. Bernet, R., Kern, I., Marbach, E.: Edmund Husserl, Darstellung seines Denkens. Meiner, Hamburg 1989.Google Scholar
  3. Drummond, J.-J.: Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism. Kluwer, Dordrecht 1990.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Gurwitsch, A.: Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology. Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1966.Google Scholar
  5. Heidegger, M.: Sein und Zeit. Niemeyer, Tübingen 1979.Google Scholar
  6. Holenstein, E.: Phänomenologie der Assoziation. Nijhoff, Den Haag 1972.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Levinas, E.: En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger. Paris 1988.Google Scholar
  8. Lingis, A.: “Intentionality and Corporeity.” Analecta Husserlian I, Dordrecht 1970.Google Scholar
  9. Lingis, A.: “Hyletic data.” Analecta Husserliana II, Dortrecht 1972.Google Scholar
  10. Melle, U.: Das Wahrnehmungsproblem und seine Verwandlung in phänomenologischer Einstellung. Den Haag 1983.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Merleau-Ponty, M.: Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1962.Google Scholar
  12. Merleau-Ponty, M.: Signs, ed. J. Wild, Evanston 1964a.Google Scholar
  13. Merleau-Ponty, M.: L’ceil et l’esprit. Gallimard, Paris 1964b.Google Scholar
  14. Merleau-Ponty, M.: The Visible and the Invisible. Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1968.Google Scholar
  15. Mohanty, J.N.: The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy. Nijhoff, The Hague 1985.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Mohanty, J.N.: Transcendental Phenomenology. Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1989.Google Scholar
  17. Waldenfels, B.: Der Spielraum des Verhaltens. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1980.Google Scholar
  18. Welton, D.: The Origins of Meaning. A Critical Study of the Threshold of Husserlian Phenomenology. Kluwer, Dordrecht 1984.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christina Schües

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations