Abstract
Practical inference (PI) is the term used, following reflections by and examples from Aristotle, for a figure of thought of the following structure:
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Premises: Comprise the ascertainment of the existence of an intention of an agent, and the claim that a certain action (or: only this action) will lead to the fulfillment of this intention;
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Operation result: The performance of the action (or the thesis that it is necessary to perform this action).
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References
I have dealt with this problem field in an earlier study: Handeln und Schliessen. Überlegungen zum Begriff der praktischen Inferenz (Action and Inference. Reflections on the Concept of Practical Inference), in F. Van Dun (ed.), The Law Between Morality and Politics, Philosophica 25, 1979, p.5–36. Reprinted in: O. Weinberger, Moral und Vernunft (Morality and Reason), op.cit. p.3807–411. In the following I will quote a few paragraphs from this study (partly in modified form).
G. H. von Wright, Practical Inference, The Philosophical Review 72 (1963), p. 159–179; German translation “Praktisches Schließen”, in id., Handlung, Norm und Intention, Untersuchungen zur deontischen Logik (Action, Norm and Intention, Studies on Deontic Logic), de Gruyter, Berlin/New York 1977, p.41–60; On So-called Practical Inference, Acta Sociologica 15 (1972), p.39–53; German translation “Über sogenanntes praktisches Schließen”, in: id., Handlung, Norm und Intention, Untersuchungen zur deontischen Logik (Action, Norm, and Intention, Studies on Deontic Logic), op. cit., p.617–81. In this chapter I only treat von Wright’s theory of the PI’s. The paper cited in Footnote 1 contains also analyses of the contributions by Jarvis, Kenny, Kim, Rescher and Wallace, which I prefer not to repeat here.
Cf. von Wright, Praktisches Schließen (Practical Inference), op.cit., p.56.
“If the second premise is wrong, it is still prossible that I (erroneously) believe it to be true. And then I will believe the conclusion to be true”,... “If, therefore, I base my reflections on the two premises, then the conclusion will be valid for me, even if the second premise, and hence also the conclusion, is wrong. This is a peculiarity of practical inferences in the first person.” (G. H. von Wright, Über sogenanntes praktisches Schließen (On So-Called Practical Inference), op.cit., p.69.)
Cf. G. H. von Wright, op.cit. p.67.
Cf. G. H. von Wright, op.cit. p.76 et seq.
I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morality), 1st ed. 1785, I. Kant, Werke (works), ed. W. Weischedel, Suhrkamp, Wiesbaden 1956, Vol.VII, p.46.
A. J. Kenny, Practical Inference, Analysis 26 (1965/66), p.65–75.
A more adequate translation would read: “namely to apply the means mentioned in the second premise”. G. H. von Wright, Handlung, Norm und Institution (Action, Norm, and Institution), op.cit., p.43. A passage from “Erklären und Verstehen” (Explaining and Understanding) shows even more clearly that, with von Wright, practical necessity is precisely viewed as a consequence of the uniqueness of the means. “If A believes that the performance of a is the sole thing sufficing for reaching his goal, then the case is unproblematical. For then the performance of a is, in his opinion, also necessary.” (p.95).
“If he (the agent, O. W.) recognizes what he necessarily should do and feels a strong aversion to it, he may change his intention and cease to strive for the original good.” G. H. von Wright, Über sogenanntes praktisches Schließen (On So-called Practical Inference), op.cit., p.70.
G. H. von Wright, Handlung, Norm und Institution (Action, Norm and Institution), op.cit., p.64.
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Weinberger, O. (1998). On the Idea of Practical Inference. In: Alternative Action Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 26. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5062-0_6
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