Skip to main content

Russell’s Intensional Logic of Propositions: A Resurrection of Logicism?

  • Chapter
  • 190 Accesses

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 76))

Abstract

It is well known that Russell’s 1903 Principles of Mathematics conceived of logic as the science of structure (of propositions). The thesis of Logicism, advanced in the work, held that the intuitions of all of non-applied mathematics could be shown to be logical intuitions—intuitions based on the science of propositions. Logicism, of course, died at Russell’s own hands. Valiant as it was, the ramified type-theory of the 1910 Principia Mathematica did not salvage Logicism from Russell’s paradoxes (of classes and predication). The system offers no genuine “solution” of the paradoxes. It requires an infinity axiom and an axiom (schema) of reducibility—neither of which can be counted as truths of logic.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Anderson, C. Anthony (1986), “Some Difficulties Concerning Russellian Intensional Logic”, Noûs 20: 35–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1972), “Thinking and the Structure of the World,” Philosophia 4 (1974) 3–40; reprinted in 1975 in Critica 6 (1972) 43-86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1979), “Fiction and Reality”, Poetics 8: 31–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Church, Alonzo (1974), “Russellian Simple Type Theory”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47: 21–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cocchiarella, Nino B. (1985), “Frege’s Double Correlation Thesis and Quine’s Set Theories NF and ML”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 14: 1–39.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cocchiarella, Nino B. (1989), “Conceptualism, Realism, and Intensional Logic”, Topoi 8: 15–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Landini, Gregory (1989), “New Evidence Concerning Russell’s Substitutional Theory”, Russell 9: 26–42.

    Google Scholar 

  • Landini, Gregory (1990), “How to Russell Another Meinongian: A Russellian Theory of Fictional Objects versus Zalta’s Theory of Abstract Objects”, Grazer Philosophische Studen 37: 93–122.

    Google Scholar 

  • Landini, Gregory (1993), “Russell to Frege, 24 May 1903: ‘I Believe Myself to Have Found Classes to Be Superfluous’”, Russell 12: 160–185.

    Google Scholar 

  • Orilia, Francesco (1986), Natural Language Semantics and Guise Theory, Ph.D. dissertation (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Department of Philosophy).

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, Willard Van Orman (1980), Set Theory and Its Logic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Rapaport, William J. (1978), “Meinongian Theories of Predication and a Russellian Paradox”, Noûs 12: 153–180; errata, Noûs 13 (1979) 125.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Russell, Bertrand (1903/1937), The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd edition (London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1983).

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, Bertrand (1905), “On Denoting”, in Douglas Lackey (ed.), Essays in Analysis (New York: G. Braziller, 1973): 103–119.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, Bertrand (1905a), “On Fundamentals”, in Alasdair Urquhart & Albeit Lewis (eds.), The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 4 (London: Routledge, 1994): 359–413.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, Bertrand (1905b), “On Substitution”, manuscript at the Russell Archives, Mc-Master University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, Bertrand (1905c), “The Theory of Implication”, American Journal of Mathematics 28 (1906) 159–202.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Russell, Bertrand (1906a), “On The Substitutional Theory of Classes and Relations”, unpublished ms. read before the London Mathematical Society in 1906, in Douglas Lackey (ed.), Essays in Analysis (New York: G. Braziller, 1973): 165–189.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, Bertrand (1906b), “On’ Insolubilia’ and Their Solution by Symbolic Logic”, in Douglas Lackey (ed.), Essays in Analysis (New York: G. Braziller, 1973): 190–214.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whitehead, Alfred North & Russell, Bertrand (1910), Principia Mathematica (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Zalta, Edward N. (1983), Abstract Objects (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel).

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Landini, G. (1998). Russell’s Intensional Logic of Propositions: A Resurrection of Logicism?. In: Orilia, F., Rapaport, W.J. (eds) Thought, Language, and Ontology. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 76. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5052-1_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5052-1_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6122-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-5052-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics