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On Depicting Indexical Reference

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Book cover Thought, Language, and Ontology

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 76))

Abstract

According to Hector-Neri Castañeda, indexical reference is our most basic means of identifying the objects and events that we experience and think about. Its tokens reveal our own part in the process by denoting what are “referred to as items present in experience” (Castañeda 1981:285-286). If you hear me say, “Take that box over there and set it next to this box here”, you learn something about my orientation towards the referents in a way that is not conveyed by, “Take the red box and set it next to the blue box”. My indexical tokens express what they do, not only because they issue from a unique spatio-temporal perspective that I happen to occupy, but also because they reflect my encounter with referents that are differently situated in that perspective. From your perspective, my here might be your there, my you your she, and, within my own perspective, a this differs from a that, and one this diverges from another. Encounter and orientation within a perspective are the essential ingredients in indexical identification without which particular ‘this’s, ‘that’s, ‘then’s, ‘here’s, and ‘beyond’s would be denuded of individuating prowess.1

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL, 60115, USA

    Tomis. Kapitan

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  1. Tomis. Kapitan
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Università di Macerata, Italy

    Francesco Orilia

  2. Department of Computer Science and Center for Cognitive Science, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York, USA

    William J. Rapaport

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Kapitan, T. (1998). On Depicting Indexical Reference. In: Orilia, F., Rapaport, W.J. (eds) Thought, Language, and Ontology. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 76. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5052-1_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5052-1_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6122-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-5052-1

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