Abstract
The idea of a human dignity may in many cases be described as an idea of a moral privilege. And indeed it is normally a privilege to be placed before another kind of being when resources are allocated. In the same sense it can be a privilege to know that there are moral reasons not to kill someone who belongs to the kind of species to which one happens to belong oneself. These privileges are fairly general and there are reasons to believe that there is more to say about their content. To be able to do so we have to give a more detailed account of what SA prescribes.
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Notes
Observe that we discussed a related idea in Chapter 4. However, the present discussion concerns a phenomenal question—what kinds of values something has in people’s eyes—whereas the discussion in Chapter 4 concerned the meta-ethical question whether this should be the general understanding of values.
Compare Vinit Haksar: “You can pursue certain personal ideals (such as living the life of a monk) without thinking that others are wrong in not pursuing these ideals, but you cannot show similar tolerance in the sphere of human rights” (1979: 92).
According to Gibbard (1990) anger has together with guilt a central role in morality.
This can perhaps be seen as an instance of a principle which Robin M. Hogarth describes in the following way: “‘losses loom larger than gains’. […] For most people the displeasure of a loss is experienced more intensely than the pleasure of an objectively equivalent gain” (1987: 100).
Cf. Jonathan Glover (1977: 69-70).
Singer’s position is that there is a difference between self-conscious and non-self-conscious beings in that it is only the latter kind of being that is replaceable. This is a suggestion which will be considered in a coming chapter, where we discuss some attempts to show that being a human is morally important in an indirect way.
It seems that Dworkin makes a normative distinction here between works of art and great works of art. He continues in the following way: “Of course we may believe that the continued production of great art is tremendously important—that the more truly wonderful objects a culture produces the better […]” (1993:74). I have not made this distinction in my discussion. But if Dworkin is right I believe he would say that the value of good works of art is similar to that of human life, whereas bad works of art are valueless and great works of art are both incrementally and inviolably valuable.
For instance, as Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen notes: “it is not permissible, according to commonsense morality, to kill one to save five others” (1994: 1).
In a similar vein Michael S. Pritchard claims that human dignity “is something shared by all men regardless of the offices they may hold or the social standing they may have” (1971-2: 301).
See, for instance, Paul Ramsey (1970: 115-7).
See also Helga Kuhse (1987: 15-6).
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Egonsson, D. (1998). Elements in The Phenomenology of SA. In: Dimensions of Dignity. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4974-7_6
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