Abstract
A committee makes decisions: it arrives at the decision a h say, instead of a k or a l. It does not make valuations. Yet there is some natural tendency to regard it, in these circumstances, as valuing a h as being preferable to a k and a k as preferable to a l, in somewhat the same way as does the individual. Again the preferences and choice-making of the individual are usually taken as being transitive. So, the feeling is, the ‘preferences’ of the committee will also be transitive: if a h can get a majority against a k and a k against a l, then a h will be able to get a majority against a l.
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Notes
Cf. Riker (1961: 908-9).
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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McLean, I., McMillan, A., Monroe, B.L. (1998). Transitivity and Non-Transitivity of Majorities. In: McLean, I., McMillan, A., Monroe, B.L. (eds) The Theory of Committees and Elections by Duncan Black and Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation by Duncan Black and R.A. Newing. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4860-3_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4860-3_25
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