Abstract
We have seen that given any set of preference schedules it is possible to obtain the corresponding matrix. The converse problem is: Given any matrix is it possible to find a corresponding set of schedules?
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Notes
If the total number of voters is known, a further equation is added.
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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McLean, I., McMillan, A., Monroe, B.L. (1998). The Converse Problem: The Group of Schedules to Correspond to a Given Voting Matrix. In: McLean, I., McMillan, A., Monroe, B.L. (eds) The Theory of Committees and Elections by Duncan Black and Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation by Duncan Black and R.A. Newing. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4860-3_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4860-3_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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