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Reducing the Proliferation Risk of Weapons Plutonium by Mixing with Reactor-Grade Plutonium

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Safety Issues Associated with Plutonium Involvement in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Part of the book series: NATO Science Series ((ASDT,volume 23))

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Abstract

The following proposal is made to reduce significantly the proliferation incentive of excess weapons plutonium by mixing it with a comparable amount of separated reactor-grade plutonium. Degrading weapons plutonium by changing the isotopic composition will make the construction of nuclear weapons more difficult. It would not preclude any of the long-term disposal options under discussion (MOX or immobilization). This proposal would improve the present procedure for safeguarded storage because it could be implemented faster than any of the other options presently discussed. The immobilization option would benefit from this approach because it could then be applied to (nearly) reactor-grade and not to weapons-grade material. In particular, the simple reconstruction of dismantled weapons would be impossible because the degraded material could not be used in existing weapon designs.

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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Reimers, R., Von Ehrenstein, D. (1999). Reducing the Proliferation Risk of Weapons Plutonium by Mixing with Reactor-Grade Plutonium. In: Parish, T.A., Khromov, V.V., Carron, I. (eds) Safety Issues Associated with Plutonium Involvement in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. NATO Science Series, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4591-6_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4591-6_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-5593-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-4591-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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